

# REAKTOR

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INDERES CORPORATE CUSTOMER

## EXTENSIVE REPORT



# A long-awaited, one-of-a-kind tech elite goes public

We initiate coverage of Reaktor with an Accumulate recommendation and a target price of EUR 8.3. The IT service and technology company Reaktor went public in the early summer and, at the same time, raised funds for investments. The company's key competitive advantage is built around excellent expertise and culture. The business model is interesting and includes more mature and stable operations, a more scalable Software Product business, and VC fund-type operations, all of which have synergies with one another. This is how the company differs in several ways from many sector peers. We expect solid performance in the sector context during the strategy period, but our estimates are still below the company's targets. The stock's valuation picture is at least attractive from several perspectives, but the Software Product business, which is still in its early stages, restrains the strongest buying enthusiasm.

## A different and interesting business model built around exceptional expertise

Reaktor's key competitive advantage is built around the expertise and culture of the company's outstanding employees. The company has three businesses with clear synergies. The Technology Solutions business is the core of it all, the most mature and largest business, which is built around strong expertise across eight industries. The Software Product business, which is based on core expertise, is the newest, although expertise has already been developed for This business has the greatest growth and margin potential, but the company's track record is still thin. We believe the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business is a very interesting VC/PE-type fund with a strong track record and an excellent foundation for further value creation.

## During the strategy period, evidence of the competitiveness and development of the Software Product business is sought

Reaktor aims to transition from a consulting-driven company into a diversified technology group where the high-margin Software Product business grows alongside the stable Technology Solutions business. The company has numerous growth drivers,

and Reaktor is seeking its strongest growth in the Software Product business, which holds strong scaling potential. Financial targets are business-specific and ambitious. Our estimates are below the target levels and, in our view, require further evidence and support from a better market environment to materialize.

## Considering the sector and the Rule of 20 context, we expect Reaktor to deliver excellent performance in the coming years

We expect Reaktor to grow strongly this year (15%) and profitability to be in the top tier of the sector (adj. EBIT-% 13%). In the coming years, we expect growth to slow down slightly and profitability to remain strong. Thus, we expect Reaktor to be at an excellent level of 20 in the sector context during the strategy period, measured by our Rule of 20 (organic growth % + EBITA %). Following the IPO, the company also raised funds, and this, combined with strong cash flow and debt leverage, should enable "organic" investments and/or acquisitions representing over 100 MEUR in revenue during the strategy period. Reaktor's key risks are related to the dilution of its exceptional expertise and employer brand in one way or another, as well as the AI disruption risk.

## We find the stock's valuation attractive at the least

In terms of its investment profile, Reaktor is an earnings grower. Based on the valuation methods we apply (2026e valuation multiples P/E 11x and EV/EBIT 7x, relative valuation ~30% below peers, sum of the parts EUR 8.9, DCF model EUR 9.2, return expectation ~15%, as well as EV/S multiple and the Rule of 20 EUR 8), the fair value range for the share is EUR 8-9.5. Due to the large earnings impact of the Software Product business and still thin evidence of competitiveness, we apply the lower end of the range. In our view, the market is currently primarily pricing the Technology Solutions business and the Ecosystem business, whereas the potential earnings of the Software Product business come at half price at the current share price. In our view, the clear drivers that will unwind this undervaluation are continued evidence of the development of the Software Product business.

## Recommendation

**Accumulate**  
(was )

**Target price:**  
**EUR 8.30**  
(was BEUR)

**Share price:**  
EUR 6.95

## Business risk



## Valuation risk



|                  | 2025  | 2026e  | 2027e  | 2028e  |
|------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Revenue          | 117.7 | 134.9  | 145.6  | 155.7  |
| growth-%         | 1%    | 15%    | 8%     | 7%     |
| EBIT adj.        | 10.6  | 17.2   | 17.4   | 19.3   |
| EBIT-% adj.      | 9.0 % | 12.7 % | 11.9 % | 12.4 % |
| Net Income       | 7.8   | -8.6   | 16.8   | 18.6   |
| EPS (adj.)       | 0.47  | 0.64   | 0.66   | 0.73   |
| P/E (adj.)       | 0.0   | 10.8   | 10.5   | 9.5    |
| P/B              | 0.0   | 3.6    | 2.9    | 2.4    |
| Dividend yield-% | 0.0 % | 2.6 %  | 2.9 %  | 3.2 %  |
| EV/EBIT (adj.)   | 0.0   | 7.0    | 6.2    | 4.9    |
| EV/EBITDA        | 0.0   | neg.   | 5.0    | 4.0    |
| EV/S             | 0.0   | 0.9    | 0.7    | 0.6    |

Source: Inderes

## Guidance


(Unchanged)

Reaktor's guidance sees earnings improving in 2026 The company does not provide estimates on business profitability.


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
## Share price



## Revenue and EBIT-% (adj.)



## EPS and DPS



## Value drivers

- Growth of the Software Product business and its scalability
- Expansion of the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business, particularly internationally
- Continued internationalization of the Technology Solutions business
- Value creation through organic growth and acquisitions
- Easing fears of AI disruption

## Risk factors

- Deterioration of culture and employer brand
- The disruptive threat of AI
- Large customer risk
- Acquisitions (no history and risk in cultural integration)
- The limited liquidity of the stock, combined with the potential selling pressure from long-term owners
- Weakening market conditions, wage inflation, and attrition

| Valuation                  | 2026e | 2027e  | 2028e  |
|----------------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Share price                | 6.95  | 6.95   | 6.95   |
| Number of shares, millions | 25.5  | 25.5   | 25.5   |
| Market cap                 | 177   | 177    | 177    |
| EV                         | 120   | 108    | 95     |
| P/E (adj.)                 | 10.8  | 10.5   | 9.5    |
| P/E                        | neg.  | 10.5   | 9.5    |
| P/B                        | 3.6   | 2.9    | 2.4    |
| P/S                        | 1.3   | 1.2    | 1.1    |
| EV/Sales                   | 0.9   | 0.7    | 0.6    |
| EV/EBITDA                  | neg.  | 5.0    | 4.0    |
| EV/EBIT (adj.)             | 7.0   | 6.2    | 4.9    |
| Payout ratio (%)           | neg.  | 30.0 % | 30.0 % |
| Dividend yield-%           | 2.6 % | 2.9 %  | 3.2 %  |

Source: Inderes

# Reaktor in brief

Reaktor is a Finnish technology company founded in 2000 that also has broad international operations.

The company offers industry-specific technology solutions, scalable software products (NATO-compliant), and includes the Ecosystem Venture Business of 45 companies.

**118 MEUR +1%**

Revenue 2025

**11% & 16% revenue CAGR**

Reaktor's reported and Ecosystem-inclusive compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for 2015-2025

**45 ecosystem companies\*** (combined revenue of 200 MEUR and EBITDA of 8 MEUR in 2025)


Reaktor owns an average of 33% of the companies\*\*

**38%**

Share of international revenue of total revenue in 2025

**9.0%** (average 12.3% in 2015-2025)

adj. EBITA % in 2025



Source: Reaktor and Inderes. \*in June 2026, \*\*in February 2026

# Company description and business model 1/8

## Company description

Reaktor is a globally operating Finnish IT services company that started operations in 2000. Reaktor designs, develops, and sells digital solutions (consulting) as well as software products. The company also has access to numerous types of expertise through its ecosystem holdings. The company operates in two growing target markets: In the IT service market and the defense software market. The structure of the business is based on three business units: 1) recurring Technology Solutions business (consulting across eight industry units), 2) scalable Software Product Business, and 3) Reaktor Ecosystem venture business (45 companies).

In 2025, the Group's revenue was 118 MEUR, meaning that in terms of scale, the company is a medium-sized IT services company in Finland. It is worth noting that growth in the company's history has been entirely organic and, in the context of the sector, very profitable. The company had been expected on the stock exchange for years, and Reaktor was finally listed on Nasdaq Helsinki in June 2026.

## Reaktor's market areas

Geographically, Reaktor sells technology solutions (consulting) and software products in several regions, including Europe, the US, Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia. In 2025, 62% of revenue was generated in Finland and 38% from international business, and the company's goal is to increase the share of international business. In addition to the offices in Finland (Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, and Seinäjoki), Reaktor has offices in Amsterdam (the largest international office with 80 employees), Lisbon, New York, and Tokyo.


Reaktor targets international customers, particularly in business units where the company already has an established international position, such as Aero, Healthcare, Gaming & Entertainment, and Retail units. In these business units, the company already has global reference customers and has accumulated deep, proprietary industry expertise. Reaktor's plan is to expand its international sales and delivery teams to enable growth.

We feel Reaktor differs from many domestic and European peers in that the company has succeeded well in its international expansion. The company has found major international customers at a very early stage. Further, international expansion has been organic and thus also low risk. Going forward, we believe international expansion will also be accelerated through acquisitions.

## Eight focus industries

Reaktor serves customers in eight industries: Public Sector, Cross Industries, Aero, Gaming & Entertainment, Retail, Defence & Security, Healthcare and Industrial. Each business unit (industry) has its own operational core team, sales, and industry-specific consultants. Organizing according to business units improves quality and deepens industry understanding, thereby creating the necessary competitive advantages. In addition, a large number of the consultants can also move between business units, which improves flexibility.

In a way, having operations across so many industries can be considered a relatively broad "focus," but within many of these industries, the company specializes in a particular area. For example, in digital solutions for passenger seat displays in aviation, which sharpens the competitive edge.



# Company description and business model 2/8

## Business model - Roots in an expert company that increasingly delivers industry-specific solutions

The reactor business is based on deep industry expertise and consists of three businesses with clear synergies between them.

- **Technology Solutions business:** recurring, global consulting in eight industry units (Aero, Retail, Gaming & Entertainment, Healthcare, Industrial, Defence & Security, Cross Industries, and Public Sector). This is clearly the company's largest and core part, from which the other operations mainly originate. The revenue structure can be found in the table in the right sidebar on page 6.
- **Software Product Business:** scalable products, currently NATO-compliant defense software and productization projects in other units. This is a recent business unit, the seeds of which have, however, long been built as part of the Technology Solutions business. The business has been reported from the beginning of 2026. That business is clearly the company's high-margin growth engine.
- **Reaktor Ecosystem venture business:** a business where new technology companies are founded and financed (a portfolio of 45 companies in June 2026), and the core offering is complemented through subcontracting. We believe this is very interesting from an investor's perspective, a venture capital fund-type business that has a good track record and good continued prospects for success.

We feel the company's business model differs relatively clearly from typical listed IT service companies, partly due to the Software Product business and particularly the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business. We suspect unlisted peers share several similar characteristics with Reaktor (Futurice, Luoto Company, and Reaktor's portfolio company Sevendos).

The company's go-to-market model differs significantly from most of its listed peers. Reaktor proactively presents value-creation ideas to customers based on its deep understanding of their business and industry, rather than waiting for formal calls for bids. We believe Gofore has partly played a similar role in the public sector with several customers. This approach typically leads to a restricted invitation-to-tender process where Reaktor may be the primary supplier under consideration, or to a process where the company is the sole bidder rather than a competitive tendering procedure with requests for proposals from multiple service providers. We find this model to be an important reason why the company is high in the value chain and a strategic partner. Naturally, what is critical here is the very high level of expertise among the personnel.

Historically, almost all of the company's revenue and EBIT have been generated by the Technology Solutions business. Going forward, Reaktor expects to increase the share of the Software Product business in its revenue and EBIT, of which the early part of the year provides good evidence. This year, the company has gradually started to report more information by business unit, which improves transparency into the company's business.

## Business development areas

- International sales
- Expansion of maintenance services
- Developing the ecosystem hub in Amsterdam to support growth, particularly in the Benelux region
- Acquisition focus: 1) acquisitions deepening industry and delivery expertise, and 2) acquisitions expanding geographical coverage.

# Company description and business model 3/8

## Technology Solutions business

The Technology Solutions business has been at the core of Reaktor since the company was founded. The company conducts international technology consulting for customers across eight industry-specific business units: Public Sector, Cross Industries, Aero, Gaming & Entertainment, Retail, Defence & Security, Healthcare and Industrial. The offering covers technology strategy, design, software development, change management, as well as continuous development and maintenance, and the delivery model is divided into five phases. In addition, the company applies AI within the offering of each business unit and utilizes AI tools across the service model throughout the project lifecycle. In our view, this is required for the company to remain competitive and keep pace with development.

Historically, the business has been the primary source of the group's revenue and remains by far the largest. The largest industry units by revenue in 2025 were Public Sector (20%), Cross Industries (18%), and Aero (16%).

The business is primarily based on hourly-billed and personnel-dependent execution. In our view, the business has belonged to the absolute elite in Finland for over a decade, both in terms of its position in the value chain and, consequently, its price point. This is driven by a strong employer brand that attracts the top talent in the sector, as well as a strong position in the value chain.

AI is currently transforming the industry rapidly and affects software development, testing, documentation, and design work, particularly within the Technology Solutions business. The focus of value creation is shifting even more strongly from these toward a service strategy, industry expertise, and

the ability to promote the adoption of solutions and organizational change. In our view, these very factors have been Reaktor's key competitive strengths for years, reinforcing the perception that the company's service offering is well-suited for the current AI-driven transformation. Thus, in our view, the company will continue to be among the sector's winners in the future.

Reaktor applies AI across all stages of its delivery model and expects the adoption of AI-assisted tools to improve efficiency, particularly in maintenance work. In our view, building maintenance capability has traditionally been challenging in the sector due to the very different competence profiles required for maintenance and development work. However, with AI, we estimate that both Reaktor and other companies in the sector have good opportunities to develop this offering area, also without new recruitment, by applying AI.

In addition to its size, the importance of Reaktor's Technology Solutions business is reflected in the fact that its other businesses also largely originate from it. We understand that the Software Solutions' initiatives originated and developed under the Technology Solutions business and have since been transferred from there. In addition, a smaller portion of the founders of the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business have emerged from precisely this business.

## Service areas of the Technology Solutions business



Technology strategy



Design



Software development




Change management



Continuous development and maintenance

Personnel business unit, average 2025



# Company description and business model 4/8

## Software Product Business

The roots of the Software Product business lie in consulting work. In consulting work, as similar customer needs and problems recur from one assignment to another, they form the basis for reproducible and scalable solutions. Depending on the terms of the customer contracts, Reaktor has several alternative routes for commercializing the intellectual property rights created in projects: 1) the company can develop an independent software product, 2) build a platform-based offering, or 3) form partnerships through which it participates in the commercialization of the product.

In H1'26, Software Product business revenue was 11 MEUR, or 15% of revenue (of which license revenue recognition accounted for 7.6 MEUR). The business has the potential to generate recurring and scalable higher-margin revenue.

The Software Product business currently consists particularly of the NATO-compatible Intelligence Software Suite defense product family (Nebula, Monocera, and Auriga). The Defence & Security business unit employs over 60 experts in the industry's research and development roles. Reaktor has operated in the defense and security sector since 2015, and the product family's components have been in production use for several years, with their viability validated in several NATO exercises. In our view, this provides it with a solid foundation to succeed in a conservative and slow-moving yet strongly growing customer segment (read more about the market on page 21). Finland's accession to NATO in April 2023 removed commercial barriers to exports, and products are now sold in NATO member and partner countries. Contracts can be based on recurring billing or single-license models with long-term support and maintenance services. As a testament to its strong expertise, Reaktor signed license agreements in spring 2026 with three NATO countries outside of Finland.

The first transaction in Q1'26 consisted of a 6.9 MEUR license and a 1.7 MEUR service component. In the following two Q2 deals, the license share was just under 1 MEUR. However, as we understand it, these deals are not comparable to future ones, because future deals will be more heavily based on the new pricing, where we believe the average license size is around 6 MEUR. In a typical five-year license agreement, the license income is front-loaded to the first year, after which, we believe around 20% of maintenance services and around 10% of professional services are accrued annually, meaning a total of ~30% of recurring service revenue billed from the price of the one-off license.


Productization projects are also ongoing in the Healthcare, Aero, and Industrial units. In addition, Reaktor has identified product and platform opportunities in other business units as well, and development work is currently underway in the Retail and Cross Industries units. Our understanding is that these productization initiatives can be expected to provide stronger support for revenue growth in the medium term.

In the history of the IT services sector, there are only a few examples of situations where a service company has managed to combine software product business, and even fewer in Finland. In our view, however, Reaktor's Software Product business is not purely a software product business, but also includes service business and continuous services as part of the agreement. As a result, it is also a better fit as part of the service company's business. Further, similar productization has been one of the clear strategic trends in the sector in recent years, and among those that have succeeded in the IT services sector, such as Netcompany. This is logical in the sense that, as competition has "tightened" over the years, suppliers must specialize even more deeply, and the next deepening phase from industry focus is the solution phase (more on this on page 26).

## Software Product Business

The Software Product business currently consists particularly of the NATO-compatible Intelligence Software Suite defense product family (Nebula, Monocera, and Auriga). Productization projects are also ongoing in the Healthcare, Aero, and Industrial units. In addition, Reaktor has identified product and platform opportunities in other business units as well, and development work is currently underway in the Retail and Cross Industries units.

Example of an Intelligence Software Suite license agreement: revenue breakdown (Inderes)



Source: Reaktor and Inderes

# Company description and business model 5/8

## Reaktor Ecosystem venture business

Reaktor Ecosystem is the venture business that creates and expands new capabilities while complementing Reaktor's offering through subcontracting. Once a business idea is born on the back of market research and customer contacts, Reaktor recruits the founders, acts as one a founder, and launches the business together with others. Typically, the founder is selected from experienced commercial officers or consultants. In 2025, founders had an average of 11 years of experience in the industry, and their average age was 42 years when starting the company, so they have experience.

Reaktor's holding in new companies is typically 30-40%, and financing (EUR ~300-500,000) is a direct investment, capital loan, or a combination of these. Founder risk is reduced by proven demand and the technical and commercial support of experienced experts.

The Reaktor Ecosystem venture business is divided into three operational areas – Vertical, Technical, and Scale – and five sectors: business growth, core digital services, data and AI, cybersecurity, and learning and resourcing.

The goal is that out of every ten founded Ecosystem companies, seven will establish their market position and develop into well-organized, expanding growth companies, and two will reach an accelerated growth phase where the return is more than five times the initial investment.

Reaktor had direct or indirect holdings in 45 companies in 6/2026. The average holding in 2/2026 was ~33%. Based on Reaktor's estimate, the combined revenue of the Ecosystem companies in 2025 was ~200 MEUR, and adjusted EBITDA ~8 MEUR. Reaktor actively develops its holdings, and in Q2, it established a new company, Banksmith Partners Oy. Its core expertise is in banking and asset management systems and

digital solutions. The company's ownership structure was simplified, and growth financing was secured.

We feel investors can view the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business as an interesting VC- and PE-type fund. In this sense, we estimate that Reaktor has a good chance of succeeding in this business /"fund", because the company has a good interface with top experts in Finland and can be involved from the start in their operations with a "small" initial investment. E.g., the investment in Witted has yielded a good return for the company, although its stock market journey has not been a bed of roses. From Reaktor's perspective, the risk is reduced by the small investment and the company's familiarity with the founders and, the launched business.

Geographically, the Ecosystem Business is currently mainly in Finland. Reaktor is expanding the operations of the Ecosystem Hub to Amsterdam to strengthen its position in the European market. We view Amsterdam as a logical choice, as it is also houses the largest number of personnel (80) in Reaktor's international business. We believe this is where most of the departing personnel set out to start their own businesses, making it most logical to establish the next Ecosystem Hub there. In Q3'26, the company [announced](#) the establishment of its first company there.


The Reaktor Ecosystem venture business also generates direct commercial synergies for Reaktor's core business through subcontracting, especially for the Technology Solutions business. It expects to continue sourcing much of its subcontracting capacity from Ecosystem companies.

Overall, this is a very interesting business from the perspective of synergies and particularly value creation. The challenge in evaluating this business is that we do not have full visibility into the performance of the underlying holdings or the external valuation methodology.

## Four lifecycle phases

- **Establishment** (3-4 months): 2-3 people, business concept validation
- **Start-up** (~1.5 years): Target 1-1.5 MEUR revenue, 10 people — Reaktor advisor support
- **Stable growth** (~5 years): Target 5 MEUR revenue, 50 persons. Reaktor offers marketing, financial, and management development services, intending to achieve a 100% return on investment.
- **Accelerated growth**: over 10 MEUR revenue, over 100 full-time equivalent

Further, the Ecosystem companies receive expert capacity from Reaktor as a subcontractor, and Reaktor holds a board seat (~33% holding).



# Focus areas, ownership, and differences from a VC fund in the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business

## Focus areas of Ecosystem companies

- **Business growth and strategy** – The sector includes companies whose expertise relates to business strategy, digital marketing, and revenue growth, Go-to-Market work, as well as e-commerce solutions. Portfolio companies include, e.g., Co-ventures, Gaasly, AdventureClub, Havina, Woolman, and Growberry.
- **Key digital services and products** – The spectrum of the sector is broad: full-stack software development, web and mobile applications, product management, and service and UX/UI design. Portfolio companies include, e.g., CodeMate, Brightly, Value LAB, Kaiku, Wunderdog, Krossflow, Invinite, and Forge.
- **Data, AI, and platform development** – Companies in the sector specialize in AI and machine learning, IT, cloud infrastructure, as well as DevOps and platform development. Portfolio companies include, e.g., AI Roots, Meshly, and Goodin.
- **Cybersecurity and operational expertise** – The sector includes cyber and information security, identity and access management, IT operations, and quality assurance. Portfolio companies include Cyberdo, Fraktal, Mallow, Hidden Trail, Orangit, and Premium Security.
- **Learning and resourcing** – Sector companies operate in recruitment, learning services, and coaching. Portfolio companies include Minna Learning, Witted, Softwaresauna, Tekai, Finitec, and Allies.

## Reaktor's holdings 12/31/2025

|                                                                   |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 61 NorthPoint Solutions Oy                                        | 43% |
| Adventure Club Helsinki Oy                                        | 26% |
| AI Think Group Oy                                                 | 37% |
| Allies Group Oü                                                   | 11% |
| Avenyo Oy                                                         | 56% |
| Brightly works Oy                                                 | 30% |
| Codemate Ltd                                                      | 31% |
| Fairness & Friends Oy                                             | 10% |
| Feed A/S                                                          | 33% |
| Fraktal Ltd                                                       | 40% |
| FusionID Oy                                                       | 42% |
| Good-In People Oy                                                 | 39% |
| GrowBerry Ltd                                                     | 26% |
| Kaiku Crew Oy                                                     | 50% |
| Krosswise Ltd                                                     | 36% |
| Liminal Group Oy                                                  | 50% |
| Locoda Oy                                                         | 45% |
| Meshly Oy                                                         | 50% |
| Minna Learning Oy                                                 | 34% |
| Premium Security Associates Oy                                    | 41% |
| Robot automation Group Oy                                         | 24% |
| Sevendos Oy                                                       | 29% |
| Silmaril innovations Oy                                           | 50% |
| Tekai Ltd.                                                        | 32% |
| The value Lab Oy                                                  | 27% |
| Voizy Ltd                                                         | 19% |
| Witted                                                            | 20% |
| <b>Ecosystem subsidiaries consolidated into Reaktor's figures</b> |     |
| Mallow Ltd                                                        | 62% |
| SplendED Oy                                                       | 56% |
| Nieve Consulting Services S.L.                                    | 49% |

## Reaktor Ecosystem vs. VC fund business

|                           | Reaktor Ecosystem                              | Traditional VC                                              |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Investment horizon</b> | No fixed time limit                            | Typically a 10-year fund                                    |
| <b>Investment size</b>    | 300-500 KEUR per company                       | Varies widely                                               |
| <b>Operational role</b>   | Active: subcontractor, advisor, board position | Varies                                                      |
| <b>Required return</b>    | 3-5x as portfolio average                      | Often 10x+ from individual winners, but most companies fail |
| <b>Strategic interest</b> | Return + subcontractor capacity + capabilities | Net return                                                  |
| <b>Mandatory exit</b>     | No                                             | Yes (fund's lifecycle)                                      |
| <b>Founder background</b> | Experienced consultants (average age 42)       | Mixee                                                       |

Key difference: For Reaktor, Ecosystem companies create value **even before exit** as subcontractor capacity (~80% of subcontracting) and complementary capabilities. This makes it more **of a strategic development platform than a pure investment instrument**.

# Company description and business model 6/8

## Business synergies are clear

In our view, the synergies between the different businesses are clear. The Technology Solutions business continuously uses the Ecosystem business mainly for subcontracting, which benefits both. A large share of the business ideas in the Software Product business originates from the Technology Solutions business. We believe a large share of the founders of the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business originate from the Technology Solutions business. Thus, the synergies between the businesses are both cross-selling and the transfer/transition of expertise. At the same time, through its Ecosystem Business, the company can partly avoid top talent leaving to found their own companies, as it is partly involved as an owner in the new venture.

## Compelling customer references

Reaktor's customer relationships are typically built as long-term strategic partnerships rather than individual project deliveries. The company's model, based on industry understanding, through which Reaktor proactively identifies and develops new value creation opportunities in existing customer relationships, supports continuous expansion of customer accounts. Reaktor is often a significant supplier to the customer, as the company frequently takes responsibility for business-critical digital systems, the transfer of which to another supplier would be challenging and costly.

Reaktor's reference customer base includes global airlines, large European consumer brands, major gaming and entertainment companies, multinational industrial corporations, healthcare providers, medical technology companies, banks, insurance companies, and public sector organizations. In total, the company had 119 active customers in 2025, which is a relatively small number and reflects the

large scale of the customer relationships. The same picture is painted by the ten largest customers, which accounted for 53% of revenue. Thus, the customer risk is higher than usual. However, we believe that these larger customer accounts are often built upon several separate projects, which decreases the level of customer risk and reflects the company's strength across multiple areas of its offering. Annual customer churn has been low (5-7% in 2024-2025) and net customer retention high (2025: 97%), which also reflects strong performance among customers.

Reaktor's solutions have received widespread international recognition and have been awarded, e.g., the Red Dot Design Award, Webby Awards, Emmy Awards, and German Innovation Award.


## Pricing and billing rates by industry

In the sector, we often examine the revenue per employee parameter, which provides insight into pricing and billable utilization. When examined by customer industry, somewhat surprisingly, the public sector's revenue per employee is the highest (table on the right). It is generally understood that the price point in the public sector is lower than in the private sector. We believe the explanatory factor is the better billing rates of long-term public sector contracts, which pushes the revenue per employee parameter higher than in the private sector. In a way, this hypothesis is also supported by Gofore's figures, a strong public sector, and some of the best margins in the sector for many years. On the other hand, the high parameter could also be explained by the higher use of subcontracting. Based on public offers and comments we have heard from the sector, it can also be noted that Reaktor's pricing is at the top of the sector in Finland.

## Customer references



Revenue per employee 2025



Source: Reaktor and Inderes

# Company description and business model 7/8

## Culture and top-tier expertise are a key competitive factor

In our view, Reaktor's strengths and competitive factors are based on the company's highly skilled personnel and organizational culture. This is a key factor in everything, and the success of all the company's businesses is based on this. We also believe this is a key reason for the successful international expansion and its continuation.


At the end of 2024, around 40% of the company's employees had over 13 years of experience in the industry, which illustrates the company's deep expertise. The average duration of the employment relationships was 6.6 years in early 2026, which, in our view, indicates high job satisfaction. However, the company was forced to hold its first change negotiations at the end of last year, which inevitably has a negative impact on job satisfaction. On the other hand, all Finnish listed peers and several unlisted ones have also carried out change negotiations, and thus this is no longer exceptional in the sector in any way. In our view, due to the company's (and companies' in general) increased scale and technological development, there will always be areas at some time horizon where customer demand weakens, which creates a sort of "continuous" need for restructuring.

Reaktor's operating culture is supported by three principles. First, the work focuses on the essentials, technical competence is used in combination with sound judgment and close cooperation, and the customer's needs guide the work. In our view, this is important for building a long-term and strategic customer relationship. Second, things are brought to the finish line with design and software


development running parallel and swiftly, resulting in high-quality and practically viable solutions. This is natural and, in our view, a widely applied practice in the sector. Thirdly, the company's goal is continuous renewal, which means challenging established industry practices and helping customers evolve in an evolving environment. We view this as the most important principle that deepens customer relationships and provides the prerequisites for becoming a pioneer and a strategic IT service provider.

We believe the company's strong expertise and preserving its culture (not to mention reinforcing it) is the most crucial thing to nurture. At the same time, culture and the weakening of strong expertise are also the key risk factors for the development of the company's continued good story. The company's listing is one potential trigger for the realization of this risk. However, we believe the company has already prepared for this for years and prepared its personnel for the listing. From the company's perspective, the listing is merely an intermediate step, and it continues to strive to be the best workplace for professionals where they can also continue to develop. The employer image should continue to be supported by culture, autonomy, leading and interesting projects, and a strong sense of community. On the back of the personnel development in Q2'26 (+7), there are at least no signs yet of major departures due to the IPO and, consequently, of the realization of risks related to personnel or culture.

Headcount development and share of subcontracting



Personnel by country, Q1'26



# Company description and business model 8/8

## Most of the work is still low-risk, time-based billing

The majority of revenue is time- and material-based. Reaktor also enters into fixed-price contracts when commercially warranted. Fixed-price contracts, where both the project price and the deliverables and schedule are strictly locked in advance, are less common. The company's portfolio also includes value- and earnings-based pricing models, but Reaktor does not yet have any significant contracts relying on these. A third alternative to time-and-material billing is retainer-type agreements, which we understand the company has used with some of its largest customers. Overall, we view the billing risk related to projects as relatively low. However, due to the impact of AI, we estimate that new pricing models will emerge over time in the coming years.

## Founders still actively involved in Reaktor's operations and employees broadly represented as owners

The founders remain strong anchor shareholders. Four of the company's founders – Antti Mäkelä (11.1%), Vesa Lauronen (9.4%), Tuomas Routto (4.7%), and Hannu Terävä (4.7%) – together own 29.8% of the shares and remain involved either on the board or in the operational management. CEO Pekka Horo is also one of the largest owners (1.3%).

Alongside the founders, there is exceptionally wide personnel ownership. Those among the 30 largest shareholders who still work at Reaktor own a total of some 37% of the shares, and the list includes several employees who have been with the company for over 20 years as significant shareholders. In our view, broad employee ownership engages key personnel, supports the

preservation of the company's unique culture, and aligns the interests of employees with those of shareholders. On the other hand, after the listing, it may create intermittent selling pressure on the share, which is quite natural for newly listed companies with a high level of employee ownership. The company mitigated this risk through employee share sales and [stabilization measures](#) in connection with the listing, but they ended in mid-July. Stabilization measures totaled 990,000 shares during the first month, representing 3.7% of the share capital.


## Reaktor's business model is more challenging to evaluate than that of a typical IT service company

From an analyst's perspective, evaluating the company's business model is more challenging than that of a typical IT services company. This creates wider than usual ranges for estimates and valuation. The assessment of the Technology Solutions business is relatively straightforward, because a strong core, long history, and personnel-dependent revenue model improve predictability. Assessing the Software Product business is made more difficult by its short history, preliminary track record of single-industry solutions, as well as the magnitude of licenses and the timing of revenue recognition. Assessing the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business is, in turn, complicated by limited information and its complex structure.

Largest shareholders, end of September 2026

|    | Name                                            | Number of shares | % of shares | Description                                             |
|----|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 1  | Mäkelä Antti Kalevi                             | 2,818,860        | 11.07       | Founder and Board Member                                |
| 2  | Lauronen Vesa                                   | 2,394,501        | 9.41        | Founder and Board Member                                |
| 3  | Mariatorp Oy                                    | 2,202,300        | 8.65        |                                                         |
| 4  | Mutual Pension Insurance Company Ilmarinen      | 1,978,181        | 7.77        |                                                         |
| 5  | Routto Tuomas                                   | 1,204,109        | 4.73        | Founder and Head of Reaktor USA                         |
| 6  | Terävä Hannu Juhani                             | 1,165,000        | 4.58        | Founder and advisor to Reaktor's remuneration committee |
| 7  | Lukumaa Timo Juhani                             | 1,122,156        | 4.41        |                                                         |
| 8  | Köykkä Hanna-leena                              | 856,000          | 3.36        |                                                         |
| 9  | Reaktor Group Plc                               | 734,880          | 2.89        |                                                         |
| 10 | Valkonen Hannu Petteri                          | 613,632          | 2.41        | Still at Reaktor                                        |
| 11 | Aktia Capital Investment Fund                   | 561,560          | 2.21        |                                                         |
| 12 | Matilainen Teemu Juhani                         | 471,072          | 1.85        | Former employee (19 years, until 2019)                  |
| 13 | Danske Invest Finnish Equity Fund               | 462,869          | 1.82        |                                                         |
| 14 | Säästöpankki Kotimaa investment fund            | 356,060          | 1.4         |                                                         |
| 15 | Rantalaaho Timo                                 | 355,000          | 1.39        | Still at Reaktor (+25 years)                            |
| 16 | Säästöpankki Pienyhtiöt investment fund         | 350,000          | 1.37        |                                                         |
| 17 | Tuomaala Antti Juha Petteri                     | 336,480          | 1.32        |                                                         |
| 18 | Horo Pekka                                      | 323,056          | 1.27        | CEO                                                     |
| 19 | Ylä-ilomäki Markus Mikael                       | 301,664          | 1.18        | Still at Reaktor (+25 years)                            |
| 20 | Kuivalainen Timo Paavo                          | 266,000          | 1.04        |                                                         |
| 21 | DNB Carnegie Investment Bank AB, Finland Branch | 260,694          | 1.02        |                                                         |
| 22 | Kytömäki Jyri Kosti                             | 250,464          | 0.98        | Former employee (20 years, until 2021)                  |
| 23 | Mutual Pension Insurance Company Varma          | 250,000          | 0.98        |                                                         |
| 24 | Veritas Pension Insurance Company               | 250,000          | 0.98        |                                                         |
| 25 | Mutual Pension Insurance Company Elo            | 250,000          | 0.98        |                                                         |
| 26 | Maijala Tommi Antti Petteri                     | 185,000          | 0.73        |                                                         |
| 27 | Pirttikoski Hannes Oskari                       | 126,384          | 0.5         | Still at Reaktor (+23 years)                            |
| 28 | Siltanen Jussi Eerikki                          | 110,224          | 0.43        | Still at Reaktor (+23 years)                            |
| 29 | Freeman Joni Marko Olavi                        | 104,992          | 0.41        | Still at Reaktor                                        |
| 30 | Nykopp Olof Sebastian                           | 89,888           | 0.35        |                                                         |
|    | 30 largest shareholders total                   | 20,751,026       | 81.51%      |                                                         |
|    | In joint account                                | 56,576           | 0.22%       |                                                         |
|    | Others                                          | 4,651,048        | 18.27%      |                                                         |


# Reaktor's group structure







# Reaktor's key figures

|                                      | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | FAS         | IFRS        | IFRS        | IFRS        |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Condensed income statement</b>    | <b>2015</b> | <b>2016</b> | <b>2017</b> | <b>2018</b> | <b>2019</b> | <b>2020</b> | <b>2021</b> | <b>2022</b> | <b>2023</b> | <b>2024</b> | <b>2025</b> |
| <b>Revenue</b>                       | 43.2        | 53.2        | 68.0        | 79.2        | 91.8        | 100.1       | 119.3       | 117.3       | 120.3       | 116.9       | 117.7       |
| <b>EBITDA</b>                        | 8.2         | 9.4         | 11.1        | 10.1        | 11.3        | 15.5        | 14.7        | 13.1        | 15.0        | 13.5        | 12.2        |
| <b>EBIT (adj.)</b>                   | 6.4         | 7.6         | 10.4        | 9.4         | 10.3        | 14.4        | 13.9        | 12.3        | 13.8        | 12.4        | 10.6        |
| <b>EBIT</b>                          | 6.4         | 7.6         | 10.4        | 9.4         | 10.3        | 14.4        | 13.9        | 12.3        | 10.6        | 9.4         | 8.1         |
| <b>Profit before tax</b>             | 6.3         | 7.3         | 11.0        | 9.4         | 10.4        | 13.9        | 14.4        | 13.6        | 4.8         | 7.4         | 8.9         |
| <b>Net profit</b>                    | 4.5         | 5.2         | 8.6         | 7.5         | 7.8         | 11.0        | 11.8        | 11.6        | 2.9         | 5.6         | 7.8         |
| <b>Earnings per share</b>            |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.18        | 0.35        | 0.36        |
| <b>Key figures</b>                   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| <b>Revenue growth-%</b>              | 0.0%        | 23.2%       | 27.7%       | 16.5%       | 15.9%       | 9.1%        | 19.2%       | -1.7%       | 2.5%        | -2.8%       | 0.7%        |
| <b>EBITDA-%</b>                      | 18.9%       | 17.7%       | 16.3%       | 12.8%       | 12.4%       | 15.4%       | 12.4%       | 11.2%       | 12.5%       | 11.5%       | 10.3%       |
| <b>Adj. EBIT-%</b>                   | 14.8%       | 14.3%       | 15.3%       | 11.8%       | 11.3%       | 14.4%       | 11.6%       | 10.5%       | 11.4%       | 10.6%       | 9.0%        |
| <b>EBIT %</b>                        | 14.8%       | 14.3%       | 15.3%       | 11.8%       | 11.3%       | 14.4%       | 11.6%       | 10.5%       | 8.8%        | 8.0%        | 6.9%        |
| <b>ROE %</b>                         | 28%         | 27%         | 41%         | 32%         | 30%         | 33%         | 30%         | 37%         | 14%         | 46%         | 127%        |
| <b>ROCE %</b>                        | 39%         | 40%         | 41%         | 34%         | 35%         | 36%         | 31%         | 39%         | 17%         | 38%         | 72%         |
| <b>Equity ratio</b>                  | 65%         | 64%         | 52%         | 62%         | 58%         | 59%         | 58%         | 64%         | 27%         | 9%          | 12%         |
| <b>Net gearing</b>                   | -32%        | -32%        | -6%         | 0%          | -7%         | -25%        | -8%         | -23%        | -16%        | 17%         | 30%         |
| <b>Net debt / EBITDA</b>             | -0.64       | -0.66       | -0.11       | 0.01        | -0.16       | -0.55       | -0.21       | -0.55       | -0.17       | 0.05        | 0.15        |
| <b>EBITDA/net financial expenses</b> |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| <b>Share indicators</b>              |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| <b>EPS (adjusted)</b>                |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.38        | 0.54        | 0.47        |
| <b>DPS</b>                           |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.69        | 0.44        | 0.15        |
| <b>Equity / share</b>                |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 1.18        | 0.32        | 0.33        |

# Risk profile of the business model



# Relevant reported indicators for the sector



# IT services market 1/9

## Large overall market in the Nordic countries and Finland

According to Radar, the size of the Nordic (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark) IT services market was ~28 BEUR in 2024. Radar has estimated the total Finnish IT market to be over 7 bn. The IT services market accounts for 4.8 bn of this, divided into 2.5 bn in consulting, 0.3 bn in management consulting, 0.6 bn in cloud solutions, and 1.2 bn in outsourcing. By customer, we estimate that this is still approximately 75% to the private sector and 25% to the public sector. We do not believe the market size limits the growth opportunities of the companies we follow in the big picture. The private sector accounts for ~80% of Reaktor's revenue, and we estimate that the private sector will recover faster than the public sector.

The definition of the IT services market and its euro-denominated size continues becoming obscure as the role of IT and technology continues rising from the engine room to the operational core in various industries because of digitalization. The operating field of IT services companies crosses paths with new parallel markets that have not conventionally been considered part of the IT markets. These include, for example, strategy consulting, transformation management and service design. As IT services have risen from customer support functions into a part of core processes, this development will continue. In addition, deeper industry expertise brings a need for industry-specific skills as well.

## Market growth driven by digital services

According to various estimates, the conventional service areas are expected to grow by an average of 1-4% p.a. New digital services are expected to grow by 5-10% depending on the sub-area, although their demand is more cyclical, as seen in the drop in demand in 2023-2025. Market growth

is slowed down by decreasing demand for conventional infra and older generation software solutions. Conventional IT systems are modernized, creating a rapidly growing area between the two (e.g. SAP cloud transformation).


By service area, we believe cloud services, transformation management, data & analytics, automation and AI solutions are growing faster than the market. Cybersecurity services have been a hot growth area in recent years, but many players face challenges in turning their businesses profitable. Security and defense solutions have clearly emerged as a growing area, and this is also a key growth area for Reaktor.

In the past, Reaktor has succeeded in capturing market growth by positioning itself in the fastest-growing service areas of the IT market and being at the top of the value chain. It has been one of the fastest-growing IT service companies in Finland over the past decade.


## There is uncertainty in the market in the short term

We expect the performance of the IT services sector to be mixed in 2026. The demand environment was challenging for a long time, and last year it gradually shifted to a watchful and cautious state. In late 2025 and early 2026, cautious positive signals were finally received from the market, which began to be reflected in the numbers. There are still companies whose transformation and turnaround are still ongoing and whose revenue is even decreasing significantly. However, the need for IT services and the trend of digitalization have not stopped, and areas of faster growth have constantly been found, as the development of critical activities cannot be stopped. Our main concern in the sector is the geopolitical uncertainty caused by wars, as well as the continued fierce price competition in the IT services market, especially in the public sector.

Listed IT services sector in Finland, revenue



Listed IT services sector in Finland, profitability



# IT services market 2/9

We estimate the organic revenue of listed Finnish IT services companies to decrease by 4% in 2026 (2025: -4%). In 2019-22, the organic growth of the companies we follow averaged 9% annually, and in 2023-24, it averaged -1%.

The expected gradual strengthening of the general economic development in Finland and Europe and the decline in interest rates provide some light at the end of the tunnel and, in our opinion, create the conditions for a gradually improving demand outlook in H2'26. We expect the private sector to turn for the better before the public sector. However, the timing and magnitude of the recovery in demand are difficult to estimate, which keeps uncertainty elevated for the moment. If the war in Iran continues, it will also indirectly affect customer demand.

### The market's long-term growth prospects remain good

The digitalization of society requires a huge number of hands to build, integrate and maintain new applications, which means that the long-term demand fundamentals of IT consulting companies are good. Therefore, IT services companies offer investors a good opportunity to invest in the digitalization trend with the more limited risk profile of the service business. However, in our view, the market disruption and rapid technological development will clearly separate the winners from the losers in the future. In the big picture, however, we believe the market can still be expected to grow faster than GDP in the long term, as IT is no longer merely a support function.

However, the market is cyclical, and the volume of IT services that companies buy externally can also decline and price competition intensify, as in the weaker economic situation in 2022-25. In the boom years, the shortage of skilled workers partly supported the growth of IT services companies, as customers were unable to recruit and had to

buy more services than they wanted from consultants. In addition, it is important to note that in the rapidly changing IT services sector, driven by technological advancements, new growth areas are constantly emerging, while previous growth areas almost inevitably turn into declining areas at some point. In addition, AI is a clear threat and opportunity. At worst, it could severely disrupt the market, as partly seen in software development, but it also creates a lot of new demand.


### Changing nature of IT investments divide the market

The change in the IT services market over the last 10 years or so can be illustrated in a simplified way by dividing the market into rapidly growing new digital services and declining traditional software development. The market revolution created strong growth potential for many original players of the new era (e.g. Futurice, Solita, Reaktor, Siili, Gofore and Vincit), that are profiled as developers of new digital services. Dividing the market into two is, however, becoming less relevant for this part, as new digital services cannot be discussed separately from the core business systems, and, for example, we estimate that the clearest growth phase of the strongly growing market for customized software development is now behind us.


Organizations' established data systems will not disappear, but they must be modernized to work as platforms for new digital services. IT investments are directed at new functionalities that are built with interface solutions on top of existing systems. Correspondingly, this trend has restored competitive advantage to more conventional players, while many, primarily digital service developers that have succeeded mainly by acquiring talent, have been forced to reassess their strategies.



Finnish IT services market and growth outlook



Market breakdown by sector



# Defense software market

The defense software market is undergoing a significant structural change driven by geopolitical tensions, growing interest in digital defense capabilities in NATO countries, and NATO's new interoperability requirements. Reaktor's Intelligence Software Suite targets the software segment that enables intelligence, situational awareness, data integration from various platforms, and AI-powered decision support.

## Market size

- According to an estimate by McKinsey, NATO member states will cumulatively invest more than 500 BEUR in defense software in 2026- 2030 (approx. 6% of cumulative defense spending).
- Based on McKinsey's estimate, NATO countries' defense spending will grow by an average of 9% to 1,959 BEUR in 2025-2030.
- According to Reaktor, the indicative market potential of the Intelligence Software Suite product family within the Software Product business is around 3.5 BEUR by 2030.


## Market growth drivers

- Geopolitical tensions and years of underinvestment in digital capabilities.
- NATO's Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy 2030.
- Digitalization of warfare and the growing share of software in defense budgets.
- The transition towards European defense technology sovereignty.


## Competitive landscape

- High market entry barrier: multi-year accreditations and 18-36 month procurement cycles.
- According to Reaktor, only two other products currently meet NATO's 2030 interoperability requirements, and one is under development – highly concentrated competition.
- Estimated customer lifecycle of 10+ years and customer churn close to zero.
- In the defense software market, Reaktor currently competes with established defense software companies.
- However, we believe the competitive situation has intensified in recent years as the revenue growth outlook of the market has improved. We estimate that new competitors will emerge in the coming years and competition will intensify further. However, we feel Reaktor has a good head start due to its long history in the industry. The scale of Reaktor's business in question is still relatively small, making its position vulnerable as well.

NATO countries' defense spending 2025–2030e  
(BEUR)



Estimated cumulative defense software investments, BEUR



# AI is developing at a rapid pace

## Technological development has only accelerated

The development of AI has been tremendous over the past 2 years and particularly during the last six months or so. Leading technologies have changed, and in terms of generative AI models, Anthropic can be said to have clearly improved its position and is currently even a leader in some application areas.

## Suppliers of generative AI models



Source: Gartner November 2025

## AI has disrupted software development, but on the other hand, it also opens up plenty of opportunities for IT service companies

Currently, AI appears to have disrupted software development work. At the same time, we estimate that it will create plenty of new opportunities for IT service providers as customers continue to need help with IT and, e.g., applying AI. Many are already widely applying AI in their service offerings. However, customers have not yet been quite ready to buy larger AI-assisted project portfolios.

## Generative AI consultants and implementation providers



Source: Gartner September 2025

# IT services market 3/9

As a result of increasing digital maturity in customer organizations, they have also become more demanding buyers and active in building their own IT service teams.

The IT services market has undergone a considerable change over the past decade. Over the next 10 years the change rate will accelerate further with the rise of AI and the complexity of technology, and due to rapid development, it will become harder for companies to predict change. Thus, we believe that the ability to react and change is a key factor in competitiveness. Thanks to Reaktor's strong expertise and ambitious attitude, the company's ability to react to market changes is quick and comes naturally. This, in turn, gives the company a strong starting point to succeed in a rapidly changing market. The company's historical track record is indeed impressive in this regard.

## Three different market areas

We have divided the IT services markets into three sections as follows:

**Market for new digital services**, including development of new digital services (design, data & analytics, tailored software development, AI...). This has been the strongest growing area that was practically born only in 2010s. Customized software development was a strong growth area in the past, but demand has now clearly decreased. Well-known players in the digital services market include Reaktor, Futurice, Nitor, Siili, Vincit and Gofore, among others, and large IT generalists have also started investing in this area. The market is characterized by a low entry barrier.

Market for background IT systems and enterprise software, that includes ERP extensively and related systems covering primarily delivery, tailoring, integration and maintenance of firmware. Known players on this market in Finland include,

e.g., Innofactor, Enfo, Solteq, Digia, Sofigate, Fellowmind, Vincit (after Bilot merger), and in particular IT generalists like Tietoe and CGI. Market growth has been slow in this area and a high threshold to enter the market is typical. However, the modernization of old systems and the strong growth of many new software solutions have also created rapidly growing areas in the market.

Market for IT platforms, that mainly covers infrastructure services (local, hybrid and cloud) and ICT outsourcing. This market has mainly been the strength of IT generalists (like Tieto, Fujitsu) and the threshold for entering the market is high because the market has required economies of scale and investments. As a result of the cloud revolution, a redistribution of the market is ongoing that has generated new quickly growing players (like Nordcloud) and many medium-sized IT consultants (like Gofore, Siili and Enfo) are also entering the field. This market has rapidly shrinking (local infra) and drastically growing (cloud platforms) areas.

Cross-cutting service areas of these three markets are, e.g., data and analytics, AI (importance grows explosively, integration, cybersecurity and robotic process automation. The development of new digital services is characterized by low entry barriers, while it is harder to acquire background system expertise.


For a long time, the most visible trend on the market has been IT players striving to win over customers already when projects are being planned, as selling one hour of design work has translated into selling multiple hours of software development work. Many players seek a stronger position in the value chain by strengthening their consulting service expertise, in which case the IT supplier manages the projects and resources and does not merely deliver them. This allows suppliers to get deeper into the customer and

become a strategic partner. However, this takes time. This trend has been visible as several acquisitions on the market. In addition, many IT consultants try to expand into strategy level consulting, granted with varying degrees of success. This is one of the company's strengths; the company is positioned high in the value chain, advising the customers' top management. Thus, customer relationships are deep and continuous in nature.



Another clear trend for the players in this sector is the life cycle approach, as many new players now try to build the ability to offer software maintenance. Customers' purchases continue to shift from software development projects towards continuous software development, which changes the nature of the markets. This trend has strengthened recently as suppliers have become more centralized, highlighting strong expertise and customer relationships, a comprehensive service offering, and maintenance strength. In our view, Reaktor is among the winners here.

Common for the strategies of all medium-sized and large players is also a strive towards the position of a more business-critical partner for the customer and, in recent years, a sharpening of industry focuses. The know-how and offering of small software developers does not, in this case, reach deep enough into the customer's IT systems and processes. This development may accelerate market consolidation. When the market shows weakness, companies with the strongest customer relationships typically perform best, as has been seen in recent years. We believe the Finnish IT services market is more strongly developing in a direction where the paths of conventional and new players cross and the boundary between new and conventional IT continues to blur.

# Division of the IT services market



# Development and estimates for the listed IT services sector in Finland



# IT services market 4/9

## Background system expertise makes a comeback and one must know how to utilize related data

The strongest demand on IT markets has for years been in developing new digital services. According to our view, the market has, however, in recent years, moved to a stage where one must be able to integrate new digital services and especially related data more tightly with the customer's background systems. This is how the full business benefit is derived from new solutions.

Customers also have increasing needs to modernize their background systems because an old ERP system may act as a break for the development of digitalization solutions. Thus, the nature of the ERP market that has suffered from slow growth for a long time will change, and the market is clearly picking up. The importance of integration and data expertise also becomes emphasized.

In background systems and maintenance, the competitive landscape is much more stable, the entry barrier is higher and customer relationship are long lasting. It is also difficult to build the capabilities required for background systems. This trend towards a life cycle approach is one challenge for pure digital service developers in the competition with generalists.

## Trends in organizations' IT purchases

According to our view, the digitalization revolution will drive customers' purchasing behavior towards the following trends, where there are both winners and losers:

The AI market has grown rapidly in recent years. Recently, the market has made quick leaps, driven by the very fast development of generative AI, and almost all players are striving to utilize AI. In the first wave, productivity will improve (AI-assisted development), but it is still uncertain how the benefit will be distributed between the supplier and the

customer. The second wave will bring new business opportunities. AI projects are already carried out, but the volume is small and a large share do not go into production. In the coming years, it will become clearer what AI will affect and what it will not. Overall, however, the impact is likely to be significant over a period of several years. In our IT services provider view, it is difficult to create a sustainable clear competitive advantage with AI in normal development, and any differences will even out over time. However, in our view, companies that are able to recruit top AI talent and profile themselves in this sector at an early stage can create a competitive advantage for themselves. At the same time, AI creates a threat of disruption, especially for software development. AI is an integral part of the offering of each of Reaktor's business units, and AI tools are utilized across the service model throughout the project lifecycle.

Data and analytics is one of the hottest trends. High-quality data has become a strategic competitive factor in several industries and a prerequisite for AI solutions. In recent years, many players have brought it to the core of their strategies. The challenge for customers is to combine data from silo-like data administration throughout the organization. The winners are IT companies that are able to combine data platform expertise, analytics, AI and business understanding. This is a critical capability. The losers will be those who cannot do this.

**Cybersecurity and safety solutions still represent a relatively small part of IT service providers' offerings, but like data, they are emerging** as an increasingly strong competitive factor. AI development provides tailwind for cybersecurity demand. Buyers focus more on cybersecurity, and a lack of this expertise or certificates is a clear reputation risk for suppliers. The geopolitical situation has further increased demand. Many companies have invested and are investing in cybersecurity capabilities, but the demand has

not materialized as hoped and billing rates are still widely low.

Recently, **productization** has also emerged as a stronger strategic trend. Good examples of this are the Danish company Netcompany, which is strongly striving to transform into a platform company, and Tieto, which continues to focus on the Software business. Productization has been on the agenda for many companies before, but now we believe productization has been put higher on the strategic priority list, and companies seem to be driving a larger part of the business in this direction. Productization has historically been difficult for companies in the sector, and there has not been a particularly strong need for it due to customer purchasing behavior and strong demand. Now, however, we estimate that due to rapid AI development and decreased demand for tailored software development (and its stronger integration), the need for successful productization is more critical than before. The direction of the solution-oriented strategy is logical in the market, considering that 10 years ago, all IT service companies could do everything, and competition was almost solely about talent. A good 5 years ago, many companies began to emphasize different industries in their strategy, and thereby sought a competitive advantage in customers (i.e., competition for customers increased slightly). We are now in a situation where industry expertise alone is no longer enough, and companies have to delve deeper within industries and thereby seek new competitive advantages once again (competition for customers has tightened further). The selection of these strategic decisions is also logical in the sense that once companies have built some "deep" solutions for customers, replicating them then becomes natural (industry or horizontal solution). Reaktor has productized several of its solutions for various industries within the Software Product Business, of which defense industry solutions are in the commercialization phase.

# IT services market 5/9

**Automation and robotic process automation** are also becoming more important as service areas. Automation combined with AI enables improved productivity, flexibility, scalability, and better quality, as well as an enhanced customer experience without large and expensive system projects. Several companies in the sector have developed or acquired this expertise (e.g. Digital Workforce is an industry pioneer).

Suppliers are being centralized: Long-term strategic partners, companies with industry expertise, strong critical capabilities, and those with a broad service offering are strong in this environment. So, the winners will get a larger share of the customer's purchases in the future. The losers are suppliers performing less critical functions, small suppliers, and subcontractors. We believe that consolidation also causes price pressure, at least in the short term, but the winners of consolidation will see volumes increase.

Five years ago, **industry focus** became the core of several companies' strategies. It is therefore natural that it is typically built around existing industries where companies have competitive advantages. Strong industry expertise also made it easier for the company to become a strategic partner for the customer. Over the past couple of years, however, one must go deeper into industries to find a stronger competitive advantage. This is emphasized when competition is not as much for talent, but for customers. Reaktor focuses on eight different industries.

The competitive advantages of **a broad service offering** are clearly strengthening. As the customer's complexity grows, it requires a broader IT services provider. The need for pure resource renters will decrease as AI and in-house experts perform the software development work of resource renters. Reaktor's own Ecosystem companies expand the service

offering of the company (through subcontracting).

Building subcontracting networks was one of the key trends when the competition for experts was high. As the fiercest competition for talent has subsided, the importance of subcontracting has decreased slightly. There is still a need for critical expertise that is difficult to recruit, which means that the role of subcontracting is still relevant. In addition, it provides valuable flexibility in capacity. Reaktor uses the companies of its Ecosystem business as subcontractors.

Building **near-shore capabilities** was a clear trend in recent years, but it has now subsided somewhat. The normalization of telecommuting during the COVID pandemic has enabled even wider use of this. However, the cost level (wages) in nearshore countries has also increased but is still lagging behind the Nordic countries.

**The in-house trend** has continued to grow as companies' digital maturity has increased and the competition for talent has eased. Digitally capable customers want to manage and keep the development of business-critical IT systems for their value creation in their own hands. The direction of the trend is clear, but this trend also fluctuates, depending on the availability of skilled professionals and the investment cycles of client organizations. AI may also accelerate the in-house trend.

User orientation and the customer experience continue growing. Important areas include, e.g., digital service design, design and customer experience. Know-how in these areas will become the biggest competitive factor when selecting IT suppliers. Creative, design-centered players have been the winners. The threat of AI disruption to the sector is high.

**The volumes of many hype terms are still small, but the situation may change.** The volume of services related to

the most visible terms (VR, AR, IoT, etc.) is still small on a sectoral level. These are, however, likely to become considerable service areas over the next five years.

**The cloud revolution** is still a trend, although the strongest transition is starting to be behind us. IT operations are still being moved to the cloud, as it is often cost-effective, flexible, and a prerequisite for new digital business models. Almost all IT services companies have some level of cloud expertise, but the most successful are those with strong expertise in cloud technologies. The biggest cloud transformation is starting to be over in the Nordic countries, and now we are moving to continuous cloud service/maintenance.

Customer organizations becoming silo-like will be a challenge for IT company sales. In addition to data administration, the IT buyer is increasingly marketing or product development, but building of a digital business requires cooperation between these areas and the ability to manage the whole. Players that manage large entities and who can address the customer's management and marketing are the winners.

The importance of cheaper offshore resources as a competitive factor diminishes as it is hard to generate new digital services reliably, fast enough and cost efficiently with offshore resources. RPA and AI weaken the competitive advantage based on low-cost labor. In addition, the price advantage of offshore and especially nearshore has decreased with higher wage inflation. Players whose competitive edge has been based on offshore cost efficiency are the losers. Players who can combine local presence with sufficient cost efficiency by utilizing nearshore/offshore resources are the winners.

# IT services market 6/9

Large, multi-year high-risk ERP implementation projects (SAP, Oracle, IBM) are no longer carried out to the same extent and the nature of the market has changed. Established ERP systems will not disappear from customers, but they will remain in maintenance mode by existing IT suppliers, and they will be moved to the cloud. Companies invest in modernizing ERP systems so that they do not become a bottleneck for digitalization projects. Generalists dependent on large projects have been the losers. Smaller players that have integration expertise are the winners. The delivery time for implementation projects has also clearly decreased, which has reduced the workload of IT services companies.

As business-driven purchasing becomes more common, and also with the advent of AI, IT companies are looking for new value-based and more scalable pricing models to detach their business model from the poorly scalable sale of expert resources. However, this has been historically difficult. AI can force companies to change their pricing logic away from time & material-based pricing.

Ownership of customers' IT budgets has largely shifted from the CIO role to the role of business directors and marketing. Players that understand the customer's business and industry are the winners, which is also reflected in the fact that IT suppliers are increasingly focused on specific industries.

## Lack of experts, wage inflation and customer prices are the nut to crack in the sector

Regardless of the cycle, the equation is challenging, but the priorities and the core of the challenge change depending on the cycle. Now, in a weaker customer demand environment, the challenge is falling customer prices and the fact that wage inflation is not equally flexible. In a "normal" market, the lack of experts and stronger wage inflation than customer price increases are key challenges. It becomes increasingly difficult

over time to solve this equation through continuously improving efficiency. For senior talent, companies must be able to distinguish themselves with factors other than salary. Traditionally, these have included interesting client projects and a good work environment for career development. Companies must also be able to retain employees and minimize attrition.

Currently, in the short term, there is no shortage of experts, but they have been readily available in 2022-25. As the market situation and demand normalize again, we expect the shortage of experts to return, but not as dramatically as before, at least in the medium term. We expect the lack of experts to be more service area-specific in the future (e.g. experienced AI experts and data experts now).

Based on discussions we have had with various companies, wage inflation has been 1-6% in 2020-2025, depending on emphasized skills. With the three-year collective agreement for the technology industry, salaries will increase by 2.5%, 2.9% and 2.4% in 2025-2027. In 2026, Tieto expects wage inflation to be 3-4% (2022-25: 4-5%), but it is driven by higher wage inflation in offshore countries and is lower in the Nordic countries. In 2021-25, Gofore's wage inflation was 6%, 3%, 4%, 1% and 0.9%. In the IT services sector, Gofore (since the beginning of 2022), Siili, Vincit and Innofactor have their own collective agreements, which partly curb wage inflation. In the shorter term wage inflation is curbed by the slower demand situation, as in a weak economic environment attrition typically decreases, but at the same time high inflation in the recent years creates additional pressure on pay raises.

The development of customer prices has for years been 0-2% and thus clearly more modest than wage inflation. However, customer prices have decreased over the past three years, in some offering areas even clearly, which creates clear

pressure on profitability. Low customer prices remain a challenge in the sector, but no further pressure is in sight. Personnel costs represent roughly two-thirds of costs in the sector and thus comparison with wage inflation is not one-to-one, but the effect is negative for nearly all players in the sector. As a rule of thumb, customer prices are higher in the private sector while contracts in the public sector are conventionally long and thus offer continuity and predictability which enables better management of billable utilization.

## Features we expect from future market winners

The clearest winners on the IT markets in the past ten years have been companies specialized in developing new digital services that have been particularly successful in the competition for talent. The market for digital services has now reached a clearly more mature stage, and the next battle will be strongly about customers, whereas previously the battle was largely about experts. In our view, the sector's success factors change and the winners in the next five years will be:

Owners of strong customer relationships with a strategic partner role among customers, industry expertise, a strong sales machine and the ability to manage large IT projects and scale operations through a strong subcontractor network. Small players that hold the role of subcontractor and that have mainly focused on talent competition more than on customers are weak when the economic cycle weakens. Continuous and deep customer relationships are Raktor's strength.

**Data and analytics have become an increasingly critical part of the delivery** and a means to create added value for the customer and competitiveness for the supplier. The role of the service area is already important but becoming even more important and also enables wider and more efficient use of AI and machine learning.

# IT services market 7/9

**Companies who can profile themselves as true AI experts.** In simplified terms, this means the correct application of AI to the customer's business and the creation of new AI-driven services. In our view, these companies are able to grow more strongly and profitably. Of course, a basic level of AI expertise is essential for everyone to be able to operate in the market in the long term.

**Companies with strong integration and background system expertise** and the ability to provide maintenance and continuous services. Strong maintenance players are also strong when the market weakens. This is the weakness of many medium-sized digital service developers.

**Companies capable of continuous renewal.** The IT services market is in a constant transformation. Reacting to changes and recognizing them in advance is crucial for one's success. In an accelerating technological change, experts' ability to change also becomes key. Failure in this renewal exercise would directly affect current customer relationships, acquisition of new customers, relative competitive position, and thus long-term value creation potential. We believe that competitiveness in the sector must be built on a constant ability to change. This also requires the company to have very dynamic organizational models that are capable of continuous renewal. Reaktor's adaptability comes naturally, through excellent expertise and high ambition.

In the big picture, we have been saying for some time that the current market situation and the market disruption created by artificial intelligence will more clearly separate the winners and losers in the sector. Now that the market disruption has continued for about three years, and

companies have had time to adapt to the new situation, we believe we can begin to categorize the current (preliminary) market winners and losers. In terms of operational figures from recent years, we believe that Digia, Digital Workforce, Gofore, Reaktor, and Witted have either continued to perform well relative to the sector and/or succeeded strategically in their transformation. From the perspective of operational figures and strategic effectiveness, the current losers in the sector are Siili, Solteq, and Vincit. Netum's categorization is still a question mark, as three major contracts have ended, which slows down development. Strategically, the company has no major need to change or prove itself.

## A capital-light business model and reallocation of strong cash flow

The IT services business is capital light. Organic growth ties up very little capital, and investments (e.g. increasing sales capacity) are typically recorded in the income statement. As a result, the companies' cash flows should be strong. Acquisitions are in practice the only significant form of capital commitment. Reinvesting cash flow productively back into the business has been challenging in the sector in recent years, as finding suitable M&A targets at a reasonable price has been difficult.

In this context, it would be natural to distribute some or even a significant portion of the cash flow as dividends to the owners or, as a tax-efficient distribution of profits, buy back own shares, especially when the valuation level of the shares is low. However, the stock liquidity of many of the companies in our coverage is low, which makes significant share buybacks difficult. In this case, the alternative is to distribute the cash as dividends to the owners, as many IT services companies have done.

## Sources of competitive advantage in the market

- Strong sales and customer service capabilities are particularly important, as competition has shifted strongly from talent to customers
- Continuous ability to renew
- Life cycle offering
- Hot expert areas:
  - AI
  - Transformation ability
  - Data utilization
  - Cyber security
- Agility and speed
- Experts' abilities (CV)
- Recruiting capability

## Sources of added value in the market

- Realizing the benefits of AI
- Digitalization and digital transformation
- Business approach
- Developing new business
- Data utilization

# IT services market 8/9

## Acquisitions and consolidation will continue

Consolidation of the IT services sector was active throughout the past decade. The M&A market cooled down with COVID and improved briefly when the pandemic situation eased. As geopolitical risks and interest rates rose, the market cooled again and remains quite cold in Finland, although there are small signs of recovery.

In the big picture, most companies in the sector have a high interest in M&A transactions. Consolidation is driven by the desire to expand the expertise portfolio, geographical expansion, customer acquisition and increase supply capacity.

We believe, however, that most companies in the sector do not have a critical need for acquisitions, and the need is driven by other issues, like strategic objectives. Growth alone is usually a poor reason for acquisitions and, in our view, the greatest benefit will come through the expansion of the expertise portfolio, which will strengthen competitiveness and generate revenue synergies.

In the current market situation, where it is easy to recruit skilled people, it is especially important to find other clear synergy elements. In our view, an acquisition solely to

strengthen delivery capacity is difficult to warrant in the current situation. For an acquisition to be successful it is important that strategies and cultures are compatible.

Most companies in the sector have strong or healthy balance sheets, but for some, poor profitability and cash flow have weakened them. The use of own shares in financing acquisitions is also possible, and many companies have also utilized this option in the past. However, the valuation level of several companies is currently low and the use of own shares does not offer the same opportunities for creating shareholder value.

In our view, the use of leverage in acquisitions is still a good option, even though interest rates have risen from the zero-interest rate period, considering the healthy balance sheets and strong cash flow of the companies. A moderate leverage would also improve equity efficiency.

Capital investors are still active and building IT expert houses. Several years ago, Triton acquired HiQ that was listed in Sweden. Several capital investors have continued consolidating smaller IT services companies. The latest major transaction is the buyout of Innofactor from the stock exchange (CapMan's fund and Innofactor's CEO as buyers).

As the market for digital service development is becoming more mature and the various areas of the IT market become integrated, a broader consolidation is likely as was seen in the Tieto and EVRY, and the KnowIT and Cybercom mergers. We consider the merger of two mid-market players into a stronger entity to challenge large generalists, such as the merger between Bilot and Vincit, a possible and interesting scenario. In our view a merger should have clear revenue synergies and factors that strengthen competitive advantages. We believe there are unlisted players on the Finnish market whose expert focus, geographical presence and customer portfolio would fit in well with listed players. Clear expert areas that in recent years have been acquired to strengthen the offering include consulting, transformation management, data and analytics, automation expertise utilizing robotics, and cybersecurity expertise.

For Reaktor, acquisitions will be a key part of its strategy going forward, in addition to "organic" investments. The company has extensive experience in small early-stage M&A transactions and minority investments, but not in larger transactions integrated into Reaktor's core.

|                                    | Digia       | Gofore       | Reaktor | Netum | Siili              | Solteq | Vincit | Digital Workforce | Witted |
|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|---------|-------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------------------|--------|
| Interest in transactions           | 4           | 4            | 4       | 3     | 4                  | 4*     | 5      | 5                 | 4      |
| Need for transactions              | 2           | 2            | 2       | 2     | 3                  | 3*     | 2      | 4                 | 3      |
| Balance sheet enables acquisitions | 3           | 4            | 5       | 1     | 2                  | 1      | 4      | 3                 | 3      |
| Interesting acquisition target     | 4           | 4            | 4       | 2     | 2                  | 2      | 3      | 5                 | 2      |
| M&A in 2024-2025                   | Acquisition | Acquisitions | No      | No    | Acquisition<br>+** | Sales  | No     | Acquisition       | No     |

1=lowest, 5=highest. \*Greater interest in divestments, \*\*minorities acquired  
Source: Inderes' estimates

# IT services market 9/9

## Observations from the latest earnings seasons

At the end of 2025, we saw positive signs in the IT services sector for the first time in a long while, and organic revenue returned to growth after a long period. However, Q1'26 did not confirm this turnaround across the entire sector; instead, company-specific differences widened further. In our view, the challenging market conditions seen in recent years and the market disruption created by AI will more clearly separate the winners from the losers in the sector. Now, we feel these can also be tentatively categorized in this manner. Companies with a high weight of tailored software development and the private sector have suffered more in relative terms. Now, all companies have had to react to the changed situation through change negotiations and by cutting costs.

In recent quarters, the decline in revenue has eased, but duality has increased. Profitability has been at its lowest level of our review period, although a slight improvement is visible. We expect revenue to organically decline by 4%, and profitability to be at the level of the 2026 comparison period.

The Q2 figures for IT services sector companies can be seen in the table on the right. Key takeaways from recent quarters:

- In the full year 2025, organic revenue decreased by 4% and in 2024 by 3% (2023: 0%). In H1'26, the median organic decline was 3%, but within the sector, there were clearly weak performers and, on the other hand, several companies grew for the first time in a long time.
- Average profitability decreased to 4% in 2025 (6% in 2024). In Q2'26, average profitability was <4%, which is a weak level. The median profitability was relatively good (6%).
- The Q2'26 summary for the Finnish IT services sector can be read [here](#), the Q1'26 summary [here](#) and the Q4'25-summary [here](#). The full Nordic Q4'25 comparison can be read [here](#).

## Short-term outlook for the sector

The updated 2026 forecasts for IT services sector companies following the Q2 reports can be seen in the table on the right. Key findings on the short-term outlook:


- The market situation remains challenging, but for the first time in a while, there are also stronger signals of improvement. However, at the company level, the dichotomy is clear and is reflected in either rebounding or weak performances.
- The companies that have fared well or satisfactorily relative to the difficult market situation are those with recurring revenue, long-term contracts, deep and strategic customer relationships, and operating in the public sector. Generally, those who make business-critical decisions for clients. Companies with a high emphasis on customized software development fared weakest. Preliminary winners at company level are Digia, Gofore, Digital Workforce, Reaktor, and Witted. Preliminary loser are Vincit, Siili, and Solteq.
- Declining employee turnover, better availability of employees and uncertainty in demand have curbed wage inflation, but not enough to offset price pressure.
- Several companies' cost savings implemented in late 2025 and in 2026 support profitability.
- In the big picture, we believe that the overall development of the sector is dependent on the general economic situation, which has seen further positive economic growth figures during the summer.
- At the beginning of 2026, many sectors, including the IT services sector, have been depressed by the threat of AI disruption, which investors fear. We believe this threat is partly exaggerated in the IT services sector. Technological development is faster than before, keeping uncertainty elevated. The share price decline has stabilized, but no significant recovery has yet been seen.

|                               | Q2'26 | Growth, % | Organic growth, % | EBIT % adj. | Rule of 20 |
|-------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|------------|
|                               |       | Q2'26     | Q2'26             | Q2'26       | Q2'26      |
| Digia                         |       | 1%        | -3%               | 6%          | 3%         |
| Digital Workforce             |       | 31%       | 11%               | 7%          | 18%        |
| Gofore                        |       | 32%       | 2%                | 7%          | 9%         |
| Netum                         |       | -26%      | -26%              | -7%         | -32%       |
| Reaktor                       |       | 11%       | 11%               | 7%          | 18%        |
| Siili                         |       | -12%      | -12%              | -1%         | -13%       |
| Solteq                        |       | -10%      | -10%              | 6%          | -4%        |
| Vincit                        |       | -16%      | -16%              | -1%         | -17%       |
| Witted                        |       | 7%        | 2%                | 4%          | 6%         |
| Finnish average               |       | 2%        | -4%               | 3.2%        | -1%        |
| Finnish median                |       | 1%        | -3%               | 6.0%        | 3%         |
| Source: Companies and Inderes |       |           |                   |             |            |



|                   | 2026e (after Q2 report) |                   |             | 2025 actual       |             |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|
|                   | Growth, %               | Organic growth, % | EBIT % adj. | Organic growth, % | EBIT % adj. |
| Digia             | 1%                      | -2%               | 8.8%        | 1%                | 10.5%       |
| Digital Workforce | 32%                     | 11%               | 6.1%        | 1%                | 3.3%        |
| Gofore            | 21%                     | 3%                | 8.3%        | -4%               | 8.8%        |
| Netum             | -18%                    | -19%              | 0.8%        | -14%              | 5.5%        |
| Siili             | -10%                    | -10%              | 1.8%        | -3%               | 3.7%        |
| Solteq            | -6%                     | -6%               | 3.2%        | -4%               | 1.5%        |
| Vincit            | -12%                    | -13%              | 0.9%        | -18%              | -0.1%       |
| Witted            | 6%                      | 2%                | 3.7%        | -3%               | 1.5%        |
| Average           | 1.8%                    | -4.2%             | 4.2%        | -5.6%             | 4.3%        |
| Median            | -2.5%                   | -4.0%             | 3.5%        | -3.7%             | 3.5%        |

Source: Inderes

# The Nordic IT services market, measured by the 'Rule of 20'







# The listed Finnish IT services market, measured by the 'Rule of 20'



# IT services sector acquisitions mainly from Finland


| Date  | Buyer                    | Target                                   | Revenue<br>MEUR | EBITDA<br>MEUR | EBITDA-% | Personnel | EV<br>MEUR | EV/Sales  | EV/EBITDA |
|-------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| 05/26 | Vincit                   | Data Clinic Oy                           | 1.0             | 0.2            | 20%      | 9         |            | 1.0x-1.9x | 5x-9x     |
| 04/26 | Netum                    | Cyberwatch Oy                            | 0.7             | 0.2            | 30%      | 9         |            |           |           |
| 01/26 | Gofore                   | Essentri AG (GER)                        | 13.9            | 1.2            | 9%       | 110       | 10-15      | 0.7x-1.1x | 8x-13x    |
| 08/25 | Witted                   | Software Sauna                           | 2.9             | 0.3            | 12%      |           | 1.0        |           | 7x        |
| 07/25 | Digital Workforce        | e18 Consulting Ltd (UK)                  | 4.9             | 0.7            | 13%      |           | 5.8-13.1   | 1.2x-2.7x | 9x-20x    |
| 07/25 | Gofore                   | Huld                                     | 38.0            | 5.7            | 15%      | 404       | 55.0       | 1.4x      | 9.6x      |
| 05/25 | Digia                    | Savangard                                | 16.4            | 2.2            | 13%      | 150       | 12-17      | 0.7x-1.0x | 5x-8x     |
| 02/25 | Solita                   | PUBLIC (UK)                              |                 |                |          | 40        |            |           |           |
| 11/24 | Confirma Software        | Solteq's healthcare solutions in Denmark | 1.8             |                |          | 15        | 4.0        | 2.2       |           |
| 11/24 | Silli                    | Integrations Group                       | 2.3             | 0.4            |          | 13        |            |           |           |
| 05/24 | Eficode                  | Jodacus                                  | 11.5            |                |          | 45        |            |           |           |
| 09/23 | Digia                    | Top of Minds                             | 10.0            | 1.4            | 14%      | 63        | 12.6       | 1.3       | 9.0       |
| 08/23 | Eficode                  | Avoset                                   | 9.7             |                |          | 20        |            |           |           |
| 08/23 | Witted                   | Loihde Advisory Ab                       | 1.9             | -0.1           | ~4%      | 10        |            |           |           |
| 07/23 | Gofore                   | Creanex Oy                               | 4.7             | 0.6            | 12%      | 28        | 5.0        | 1.1x      | 8.8x      |
| 07/23 | Netum                    | Buutti Oy                                | 9.3             | 1.1            | 12%      | 110       | 10.0       | 1.1x      | 9.1x      |
| 04/23 | Azets                    | Solteq's Microsoft and Retail businesses | 11.2            | 1.5            | ~13%     | 60        | 15-20      | 1.3x-1.8x | 10x-13x   |
| 02/23 | DNV Group                | Nixu                                     | 60.2            | 2.4            | 4%       | 393       | 98.0       | 1.6x      | 41x       |
| 01/23 | Netum                    | Studyo                                   | 1.3             | 0.1            |          | 14        |            |           |           |
| 01/23 | Investcorp International | Eficode Oy                               | 150.0           |                |          | 600       |            |           |           |
| 11/22 | Solteq                   | S2B Energia Oy                           |                 |                |          | 10        |            |           |           |
| 11/22 | Loihde                   | Onrego                                   | 7.1             | 0.5            | 7%       | 30        | 4.3        | 0.6x      | ~9x       |
| 11/22 | Gofore                   | eMundo                                   | ~8              | 0.8            | 9%       | 96        | 8.0        | ~1x       | ~8x       |
| 10/22 | Digia                    | Avalon                                   | 2.4             | 0.4            | 15%      | 24        |            |           |           |
| 10/22 | Eficode                  | Clearvision                              |                 |                |          |           |            |           |           |
| 10/22 | Silli                    | Haallas                                  | 5.8             | 0.9            | ~15%     | >50       | 3.75-9.0   | 0.6x-1.6x | 4x-10x    |
| 09/22 | Witted                   | Nexec Oy                                 | 12.8            | 0.7            | 5.8%     | 80        | 8.3-12     | 0.7x-0.9x | 11x-16x   |
| 07/22 | Vincit                   | Bilot (merger)                           | 30.5            | 0.6            | 2.1%     | 195       |            |           |           |
| 06/22 | Digia                    | Productivity Leap Oy                     | 5.5             | 1.2            | 22%      | 35        |            |           |           |
| 06/22 | Innofactor               | Invenco Oy                               | 6.3             | 0.4            |          | 50        | 3-7        | 0.5x-1.1x | 8x-19x    |
| 06/22 | Knowit                   | Marketing Clinic Oy                      | 10.5            |                |          | 60        | 8.5-10     | 1.0x      |           |
| 05/22 | Pinja                    | Oiwa                                     | 2.1             |                |          | 25        |            |           |           |
| 04/22 | Digia                    | MOST Digital                             | 3.0             | 0.0            | 0%       | 34        |            |           |           |
| 01/22 | Gofore                   | Devecto                                  | 10.7            | 2.0            | 19%      | 130       | 21-26      | 2.0x-2.4x | 10x-13x   |

# Relevant reported indicators for the sector 1/2




# Relevant reported indicators for the sector 2/2


Listed IT services sector in Finland, revenue




Listed IT services sector in Finland, revenue



Listed IT services sector in Finland, profitability



Listed IT services sector in Finland, profitability



# Competitive landscape 1/5

## Competitors on three levels

Following the fragmented structure of the Finnish IT services market the competitive landscape is also fragmented. At the top level we feel the competitive field can be divided into three layers.

The first layer is international IT generalists, whom according to different market sources hold a market share of close on 50%. These global giants include, e.g., Tieto, CGI, Fujitsu, Accenture and Capgemini. The second layer is suppliers with revenue of around 20-200 MEUR and their combined market share is estimated to be around 30%. The third layer and thus the tail-end of the market includes smaller solution houses that employ less than 200 people. Overall, there have been no major changes in the competitive field in recent years.

## Reaktor's competitors

In Reaktor's markets, the IT services market is served by numerous suppliers, which the company classifies into three groups:

- In customized software development, its implementation, and IT consulting, competitors include, e.g., Solita, Gofore, Futurice and Nitor (mainly in Finland).
- Competitors for full lifecycle operators (expert services and IT consulting up to implementation and maintenance) are, e.g., Accenture, Tata Consultancy Services, Cognizant, Infosys, Capgemini, and Wipro. They operate in Finland and internationally.

- International digital transformation experts are built around software development, supplemented by a broader range of services. These include, e.g., Netcompany, Luxoft, Thoughtworks, Reply, EPAM, Globant, Endava, Nagarro, and GlobalLogic.

In certain industries, Reaktor also competes with global software developers and technology companies, such as Panasonic. The competitive field is therefore broad and multifaceted. We believe Reaktor distinguishes itself from its peers with strong technology and industry expertise, particularly in Finland. This is also indicated by the high customer prices. Compared to larger generalists, the company's weakness is its narrow maintenance business, while on the other hand, its strength is its agile operating model. In the Software Product Business, Reaktor still has a thin track record (references), which is an impediment compared to established players. In our view, the key competitive advantage does not lie in the customer base, but rather in the employer brand and the ability to attract top talent, which in turn builds the core customer strengths.



## Dynamics of the competitive landscape



\*Among the medium-sized companies, there are also internationally operating companies such as Siili, Reaktor, Gofore, Digia, Witted, Solteq, and Vincit.  
Source: Inderes

# Competitive landscape 2/5

## Various ways to combat the scale of big players

We feel the clearest strengths of large IT generalists are extensive resources and offerings, which are often strengthened with cost-efficient offshore production. The customer and industry portfolios of these players are typically extensive. Customer and industry understanding is also often deeper than for smaller players. Strong background system expertise lies at the core of IT generalists' genetic ancestry.

In practice this means that these companies' solutions are both very business critical and established from the customer's viewpoint. In addition, these background system deliveries are also technically very challenging and high-risk projects, which raises the threshold of market entry. The key sources of competitive advantages of IT generalists can in our opinion be summarized as large resources, the costs the customer faces if changing suppliers, and high thresholds to enter the market.

Next to agility, small companies usually also need some expert spearhead to be competitive against large generalists. Smaller companies also break into customers through some other buyer than IT management by selling digitalization solutions, for example, directly to the business. Thus, smaller companies do not necessarily ever face the customer's established system supplier in competition. Large generalists often operate in slightly different areas. In recent years, the biggest players in the sector have, however, started strengthening their abilities in the development of new digital services, which has made the competition tighter (e.g. more overlapping).

Because the revenue model in the industry is capital light and personnel intensive the thresholds to enter the industry have also been low in general. However, with

competition in the sector shifting from talent to customers, the barrier to entry has increased slightly, as new sales are more difficult than before and require clearer competitive advantages. We believe the biggest weakness of smaller players is that they often get stuck in the value chain and must serve end customers only as a part of the value chain. Therefore, small companies are not necessarily able to offer ambitious experts interesting career paths which also makes it more difficult to grow the business and improve the company's position in the value chain. In the competition for experts the key assets of small companies are usually cultural. For example, Luoto Company and its ecosystem have grown strongly and profitably since their establishment (2016) with a people-friendly and entrepreneur-driven salary/ownership model.

## Competitive advantages must be built constantly

Due to the good long-term growth outlook in the industry, there is a lot of competition as there are several suppliers on the market, and, as stated before, the thresholds to enter the market are low. We also believe that the preconditions to stand out merely with technical skills and individual point solutions are small. In the long term, we believe competitive advantage must be built based on more extensive skills that aim at strategic partnerships. This in turn requires that the company's operations offer continued dynamism, flexibility, and renewal ability. To be successful in the long term, we believe companies must be able to read the development of both technologies and customer needs and react to these changes by building their own capabilities.

Considering this, we believe that building truly sustainable competitive advantages is structurally hard. We do not consider this to be a barrier for long-term value creation.



## Reaktor's competitive factors

### Strengthening factors

- Highly skilled and experienced personnel. Top-tier expertise in the sector, resulting in a strong position in the value chain and important pricing power.
- A broad, comprehensive service offering spiced up with specialized product solutions, particularly in the defense sector. In addition, the broad and flexibility-enhancing expertise in the partly owned Ecosystem business.
- Deep industry expertise across eight sector-specific business units
- An agile business model that has proven viable both in Finland and internationally. As evidence of this, strong profitability over the cycle
- Deep customer relationships in Finland and internationally.

### Weakening factors

- A narrower offering vs. generalists with extensive offshore resources and broad international capabilities
- Several small, agile players as challengers in various industry verticals, a low barrier to entry, and the threat of AI disruption
- No significant integration capability or maintenance business yet
- Compared to larger players, international brand awareness is still limited

# Competitive landscape 3/5

## Growth and profitability of the peer group

The figure on the following page examines the growth and profitability of listed and unlisted Finnish and other Nordic IT service companies, as well as a few US peers. The comparison also includes some players with a stronger presence in the European market.

We monitor organic growth and the adjusted EBITA margin. The companies that have grown most strongly have expanded both through acquisitions and organically. Historically, strong organic growers have been, e.g., Gofore, Solita, Witted, Futurice, Netum, Luoto, Eficode, Bouvet, and Netcompany. However, for many of these, the past few years have been challenging from an organic growth perspective. Last year, the best organic growers were Kainos (UK), Sevendos (FI unlisted), Netcompany (Denmark), Trifork (DK), and Futurice. In recent years, the slowest developers have been IT services companies with a strong software development weight, such as Vincit, B3 Consulting, and Netum.

When looking at growth, small specialized operators in the Finnish IT market grew clearly better than the market in the 2010s and until 2022. This reflects the faltering of the demand for conventional system development, and IT demand focusing on new areas to which smaller and more agile players have been able to respond more efficiently. Over the past few years many formerly small and agile players have grown into a relatively larger size class and maintaining the growth rate is becoming more challenging. This has been visible in some companies as a slowdown in organic growth. A company that clearly stands out is the Danish Netcompany, which, despite having almost 5,000

experts (now 9,000), was able to grow its service business organically by ~20% annually and generate an EBITDA margin of over 25% (2025: growth 8% and EBITA 13%). For organic growth, the peer group median was -2% in 2025. Measured by the EBITA margin, the peer group average and median were 8% in 2025. In the IT services sector, we have considered an EBITA level of over 10% to be a good profitability level, but in a challenging market environment, a level above the sector average can be considered good. Large generalists Tieto and CGI have generated good profitability despite slow growth, which is based on their strong market position and software business.

By comparing the combination of growth and profitability over the past year, a few players stand out above the rest. Among the Finnish companies, Digia, Reaktor, and the unlisted Luoto Company fit into the star players category. From other countries, Danish Netcompany and Trifork, Kainos from Great Britain, and Globant, Endava, and Epam from the US made it into the star tier.



## Growth drivers

### Long term

- Digitalization grows the market
- AI creates new growth opportunities, but can also disrupt parts of the market
- IT will become more of a key area of companies' business and strategy
- Recovery of / increase in customer prices
- The definition of the IT services market becomes broader
- Internationalization and partly increasing nearshore
- Increasing subcontracting and, through it, critical capabilities support growth
- Business acquisitions

### Short-term

- Efficient sales function
- Recovery of customer prices
- Recruitment - employee image, low attrition
- Improving efficiency through billable utilization and/or process efficiency
- Business acquisitions




## Profitability drivers

### Short-term

- Net impact of wage inflation and customer prices
- Billable utilization
- Operational efficiency
- Adapting the cost structure to the current situation of the companies


# Competitive landscape 4/5



Source: Inderes, companies.



## Profile of competitive field



### Stars

- Forerunners with a history of profitable growth
- Mainly small and agile players that have positioned themselves and invested in growing areas of the IT services market
- The organization structures of stars are light, and they are highly business oriented

### Growers

- Companies that are growing but whose investments depress profitability
- Growth has often been accelerated with acquisitions

### Profit generators

- Companies whose customers have high costs of changing supplier, for example due to tailored software solutions
- Profitability partially optimized at the expense of growth


### Turnaround companies

- Mainly conventional IT companies that are in transition or have not been fully capable to adjust to the IT market revolution

Source: Inderes

# Competitive landscape 5/5

Finland's market structure based on customer size and service area-specific positioning



# Strategy 1/3

## Strategy

Reaktor’s objective is to develop from a predominantly consulting-driven technology company into a diverse technology group. Here, the role of the higher-margin and more scalable Software Product business is growing substantially alongside the stable Technology Solutions business.

Regarding strategy, Technology Solutions has for years demonstrated the viability of the strategy in light of sector-beating figures, and we expect the strategy to perform well also in the future. A key strength is its strong employer image, the weakening of which, on the other hand, is a key risk. In the software product business, the implementation of the strategy is in many respects still at an early stage, but strategically it is in line with the sector's latest trend of specializing in solutions and thereby going a step deeper (beyond industry expertise). We estimate that contract structures and pricing models are still searching for their final form. In addition, there is uncertainty regarding the demand in the Defence & Security unit and especially in the other previously mentioned industries, as well as the effectiveness of industry solutions. In our view, the Reaktor Ecosystem business has once again demonstrated the viability of the strategy, and it clearly has its place with a good starting point for success.

In terms of the strategy, the key differences to most other Finnish IT service peers are closely related to the nature of the Software and Ecosystem businesses and their role in the strategy. These differences improve growth and scalability potential.


## Growth drivers

The execution of the company's strategy relies on six growth drivers that shift the revenue focus toward higher-margin and more scalable Software Product business, while the stable Technology Solutions business remains at the core of the group. Growth drivers are:


- Growing existing customer accounts:** Deepening relationships within a portfolio of over 100 active customers and cross-selling between and within the eight industry-specific business units. We believe that this will happen mainly in the Technology Solutions business, but there are also opportunities for so-called "upselling" in the Software Product Business. This growth is naturally pursued primarily organically.
- New customers and international growth:** New customer acquisition particularly in the Aero, Healthcare, Gaming & Entertainment, and Retail units. In 2025, the share of international revenue was 38%, thus providing a good foundation for expansion. We understand that this growth will be accelerated particularly through acquisitions, but growth is still sought organically as well.
- Product and platform opportunities:** Productization of recurring customer needs, spearheaded by the Intelligence Software Suite of the Defense & Security unit. In our view, this is a key driver for growth and the scaling of profitability. On the other hand, this also involves a key uncertainty due to the short history and still limited track record. Our understanding is that this is done primarily organically, starting strongly from Technology Solutions, from where it is transferred to the Software Product Business, meaning that cross-business synergy is also being realized

## Financial targets

Technology Solutions business' growth target



Software Product Business' growth target



# Strategy 2/3

- **Expanding maintenance services:** Growing recurring and predictable revenue through long-term operational partnerships. Several sector players have sought this expansion without success. We believe that AI application here will partially facilitate the expansion. The company also intends to recruit expertise.
- **Reaktor Ecosystem:** Realization of value from the venture business' 48 portfolio companies over the years through exits, reorganizations, and dividends. In addition, synergistic value is created for the solution business: technical expertise and scalability.
- A new office has been opened in Amsterdam, which also serves Europe. This in itself certainly will not significantly boost the operational figures of the Reaktor group, but from a network perspective, it has good potential to act as a growth driver. A very interesting business that stands out in the listed sector, which also creates cross-selling synergies through the use of subcontracting.
- **Acquisitions and partnerships:** Acquisitions are a natural path for expansion. However, these always involve risks, and in Reaktor's situation, even more than usual, as cultural alignment has generally been important in the sector and, in our view, especially so in Reaktor's case; the company has a top-tier employer brand that talent probably does not want to dilute. Reaktor also wants to build long-term technology alliances and partnerships with hyperscalers, other platform vendors, and defense and security consultants.

## Financial targets

The medium-term (3-5 years) targets set by the Board of Directors:

- Organic revenue growth of 8-12% per year for the Technology Solutions business and an adjusted EBIT margin of 10-12%
- Software Product Business' revenue of 60-90 MEUR and adjusted EBIT of 30-45 MEUR by the end of 2030
- Dividend policy: Target payout ratio of 20-40% of the profit for the financial year at group level


The company's financial targets indicate that Reaktor is aiming for an EBIT margin of around 50% (33-75%) in the Software Product Business. Overall, our estimates are broadly below the company's financial targets (as can be seen in the graphs in the right sidebar on pages 43-44). However, in our view, the targets for Technology Solutions are the most realistic, but they require support from a better market environment. The key and greatest uncertainty regarding the targets relates to the Software Product Business, because of challenging targets, and still limited track record (2 quarters) "only" from one industry. If Reaktor succeeds in the Software Product business in other industries as well, the market and growth potential are significantly greater than our estimates.

The company aims to distribute a relatively small portion of its earnings as dividends, which indicates that the company wants to grow quite strongly through acquisitions. However, the company has no concrete targets for inorganic growth, which is natural in the sense that finding good targets at the "right price" can often be challenging.


In our view, Reaktor's operational targets profile the company as a strongly growing and profitable company overall. The company has a good historical track record regarding growth and profitability, but its targets nevertheless expect a significantly steeper trajectory for both. Profiling is also supported by a low payout ratio.

## Financial targets

Profitability target of the Technology Solutions business




Profitability target of the Software Product Business



# Strategy – growth drivers

Inderes' estimates



# Strategy 3/3

## Use of proceeds from the IPO

Reaktor raised net assets of 16 MEUR in the share issue, which the company will allocate to three strategic priorities:

- Building the Software Product business – primarily investments in the Def & Sec unit and productizing consulting work. In that area, acquisition targets are generally in high demand and valuation levels are therefore quite high, which will likely tie up significant capital, although this depends on the size of the target.
- International and domestic expansion organically and through selected acquisitions. When acquiring customers, valuation levels are generally more favorable than those of Def & Sec acquisition targets. International acquisitions involve more risks, but they are important for expansion and longer-term growth.
- Boosting the growth of the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business. We estimate, however, that this growth will only tie up small amounts of capital at a time and can thus also be continuously financed through cash flow.

In addition to the funds raised in the IPO, the company's cash flow is strong and continuously strengthens the balance sheet (net gearing -29% and net cash 17 MEUR in 2026e). The company has practically no other interest-bearing debt than lease liabilities. Thus, the company can also raise debt to finance acquisitions if it so wishes. Thus, we believe the company has around 140 MEUR of leeway for acquisitions. If necessary, the company can also use its own shares as a means of payment.

In the table on the right, we outline how much capital buying revenue growth would require. The assumption is that the

target company has strong expertise and a healthy, profitable business. Thus, the valuation of the target is also expected to be higher than the sector average. Based on these assumptions, the company should have a good opportunity in terms of capital, utilizing its cash, cash flow, and debt financing, to acquire ~100 MEUR in revenue.

## Acquisition strategy

Reaktor utilizes selective acquisitions to accelerate its strategic goals when organic growth would be slower or less efficient. We expect purchases to focus on two types: 1) acquisitions that deepen the industry and delivery expertise of a specific business unit, and 2) acquisitions that expand geographical coverage, bringing an established customer base and talent pool to support international growth.

Reaktor has no prior acquisition history, which is naturally a weakness. However, the company has plenty of M&A expertise from the Ecosystem business, but this is clearly related to a smaller size. Different factors must be considered in larger-scale M&As. We understand that the company is initially targeting slightly smaller acquisition targets, which sounds healthy. A key focus area mentioned by the company is culture and its integration. We also believe this is the most crucial issue, as there is a risk that the company's key strength and competitive factor, namely its culture and employer brand, will weaken. In the IT services sector, in addition to the departure of founders, this is a key risk that must be considered in acquisitions. We estimate that the greatest inorganic benefit will come from expanding abroad. This also makes integrating cultures lower-risk, as it does not need to be integrated under the same roof with the strong Finnish culture, even though international acquisitions in new markets generally involve, in our view, a higher level of risk.

## Reaktor's priorities in strategy implementation

- Premium position and industry specialization
- AI integrated into the delivery model
- Leading customer satisfaction and skilled professionals
- Scalable Software Product Business
- Disciplined acquisitions and partnerships

|                               |     | How much revenue can be acquired |      |      |      |      |      |
|-------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                               |     | Valuation EV/S                   |      |      |      |      |      |
|                               |     | 0.8x                             | 1.0x | 1.2x | 1.4x | 1.6x | 1.8x |
| Capital used for acquisitions | 80  | 100                              | 80   | 67   | 57   | 50   | 44   |
|                               | 100 | 125                              | 100  | 83   | 71   | 63   | 56   |
|                               | 120 | 150                              | 120  | 100  | 86   | 75   | 67   |
|                               | 140 | 175                              | 140  | 117  | 100  | 88   | 78   |
|                               | 160 | 200                              | 160  | 133  | 114  | 100  | 89   |
|                               | 180 | 225                              | 180  | 150  | 129  | 113  | 100  |

# Past development 1/2

## Strong execution outperforming the sector throughout its history



Reaktor's figures are reported in accordance with IFRS starting from 2023. Prior to 2023, Reaktor followed FAS accounting. Accounting differences mainly affect EBITDA on the income statement and interest-bearing liabilities on the balance sheet. Historically, almost all of Reaktor's revenue and EBIT have been generated by the Technology Solutions business. For this reason, the Software Product Business' revenue has not been reported separately. Going forward, the company expects to increase the share of the Software Product business in revenue and particularly in EBIT. Starting in 2026, the company has also started reporting that business separately.

Reaktor has for a very long time been one of Finland's absolute top-tier companies, especially considering the level of expertise. The company's revenue increased by 11% in 2015-2025, which was Competing for the top spots over the same period among the top-tier listed companies in Finland, Gofore has grown organically by 24% and reported growth of 31%, while mostly maintaining very strong profitability. On the other hand, Reaktor's business structure is different, and we feel its Ecosystem businesses can be seen as organic growth, as the company has been involved in them since their inception. Taking into account the revenue of the Ecosystem companies and Reaktor's holding (revenue of 200 MEUR \* 33%), Reaktor's revenue has grown by an average of 16% over the same period ("organically"). Overall, Reaktor's growth has therefore been very strong and clearly outpaced the IT services sector. The decrease in reported revenue for 2022 was due to Witted's listing and the fact that it was no longer

consolidated into Reaktor's figures. This also slowed down development in 2023.

Revenue per employee is a weaker metric than normal in Reaktor's situation when comparing to its long history, as Witted's revenue heavily impacted this until 2021, but not the personnel.

Reaktor's cost structure is very typical of an IT service company. However, unlike others, the company does not have amortization of intangible rights related to acquisitions, as it has not yet made any acquisitions. For peers, we adjust these depreciations from the earnings. Personnel costs naturally account for the largest share and have been a little over 60% in recent years, which is a lower level than in the sector. The company also uses subcontracting, which in recent years has accounted for almost 15% of revenue. In recent years, the company's margin after personnel expenses and subcontracting has been the best in the sector (23-24% of revenue). In a sector comparison, however, Reaktor's other operating expenses are "only" at a satisfactory level (2025: 13%) and could be a few percentage points lower, which would improve profitability. This is certainly explained by the fact that the company wants to invest in employee satisfaction, partly at the expense of profitability. Thus, the company's EBIT margin, which has been the same as the EBITA margin, is 9-11% adjusted for items affecting comparability in 2023-2025. We have adjusted earnings for restructuring expenses, costs related to the IPO project, and events related to redeemable shares. Over the longer term, in 2015-2022 the EBIT% averaged 13%. Profitability has therefore been at the top tier of the IT services sector historically and in recent years.



# Past development 2/2

In the lower lines, the share of profits in associated companies and joint ventures is recognized in the group's income statement below EBIT based on the holding using the equity method. This is affected by cash flow and value revision. The change in value of Witted has had a negative impact in 2023-2025.

## Balance sheet

Due to Reaktor's asset-light business model, its capital expenditures have been low, in line with the general nature of the IT services sector. Capital expenditures remained stable across all review periods and consisted of capitalized development costs and IT equipment. As an exception to the sector, Reaktor continuously makes investments as part of its business in companies operating in the same industry under the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business. At the end of Q2'26, Reaktor's investments in associated companies and joint ventures totaled 13 MEUR. Loans granted to Ecosystem companies totaled 4.8 MEUR in the balance sheet, and loan commitments related to the financing of Ecosystem companies totaled 1.1 MEUR in Q1'26. In addition, Reaktor makes investments related to growth companies. Unlisted equity investments included in other non-current receivables and investments (sweat equity investments) totaled 6.4 MEUR in Q1'26.

The balance sheet structure is light and somewhat typical for a service business, with receivables being the largest item (40 MEUR or 46% of the balance sheet) at the end of Q2'26. The company has made no acquisitions, which is the biggest difference also visible on the balance sheet, meaning no goodwill has accumulated. In addition, as stated above, the company has significant investments (EUR 13 million or 15% of the balance sheet), which are related to the


company's Ecosystem business and distinguish the company's balance sheet from its peers. Following the recent IPO, the company's cash position is larger than usual (28 MEUR or 32% of the balance sheet). The company also has a 15 MEUR standby credit facility. Thus, the company's balance sheet provides considerable leeway for acquisitions, considering the leverage.

On the asset side, interest-bearing debt consists practically entirely of lease liabilities (5 MEUR or 6% of the balance sheet) and other liabilities (28 MEUR or 32% of the balance sheet). The largest item is equity (48 MEUR or 55% of the balance sheet). In addition, the balance sheet still includes a liability for the redemption of employee shares (6 MEUR or 7% of the balance sheet), and this item dominates the liabilities. According to IFRS, the redemption liability must be recognized as debt, making the interpretation of the equity ratio and net gearing misleading for 2023-2025 without adjustments. Overall, however, the balance sheet has been strong throughout history. This is also reflected by the net debt/EBITDA parameter on the right.


The liability from employee share redemptions still partly weighs on the reported equity ratio in H1'26 (56%), and the adj. equity ratio adjusted is 63%. The net cash position was 22 MEUR, which provides ample leeway for acquisitions.

The majority of the liability for the redemption of employee shares was derecognized from the balance sheet on the listing date, and an equivalent amount was recognized to increase equity. The remaining approximately 6 MEUR will be derecognized in the coming quarters, and a corresponding amount will be recorded in equity. We will factor this into our estimates if it materializes.

Balance sheet H1'26



Gearing



# Past development

|                                   | FAS<br>2015 | FAS<br>2016 | FAS<br>2017 | FAS<br>2018 | FAS<br>2019 | FAS<br>2020 | FAS<br>2021 | FAS<br>2022 | IFRS<br>2023 | IFRS<br>2024 | IFRS<br>2025 |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>Condensed income statement</b> |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Revenue                           | 43.2        | 53.2        | 68.0        | 79.2        | 91.8        | 100.1       | 119.3       | 117.3       | 120.3        | 116.9        | 117.7        |
| EBITDA                            | 8.2         | 9.4         | 11.1        | 10.1        | 11.3        | 15.5        | 14.7        | 13.1        | 15.0         | 13.5         | 12.2         |
| EBIT (adj.)                       | 6.4         | 7.6         | 10.4        | 9.4         | 10.3        | 14.4        | 13.9        | 12.3        | 13.8         | 12.4         | 10.6         |
| EBIT                              | 6.4         | 7.6         | 10.4        | 9.4         | 10.3        | 14.4        | 13.9        | 12.3        | 10.6         | 9.4          | 8.1          |
| Profit before tax                 | 6.3         | 7.3         | 11.0        | 9.4         | 10.4        | 13.9        | 14.4        | 13.6        | 4.8          | 7.4          | 8.9          |
| Net profit                        | 4.5         | 5.2         | 8.6         | 7.5         | 7.8         | 11.0        | 11.8        | 11.6        | 2.9          | 5.6          | 7.8          |
| Earnings per share                |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.18         | 0.35         | 0.36         |
| <b>Key figures</b>                |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| Revenue growth-%                  | 0.0%        | 23.2%       | 27.7%       | 16.5%       | 15.9%       | 9.1%        | 19.2%       | -1.7%       | 2.5%         | -2.8%        | 0.7%         |
| EBITDA-%                          | 18.9%       | 17.7%       | 16.3%       | 12.8%       | 12.4%       | 15.4%       | 12.4%       | 11.2%       | 12.5%        | 11.5%        | 10.3%        |
| Adj. EBIT-%                       | 14.8%       | 14.3%       | 15.3%       | 11.8%       | 11.3%       | 14.4%       | 11.6%       | 10.5%       | 11.4%        | 10.6%        | 9.0%         |
| EBIT %                            | 14.8%       | 14.3%       | 15.3%       | 11.8%       | 11.3%       | 14.4%       | 11.6%       | 10.5%       | 8.8%         | 8.0%         | 6.9%         |
| ROE %                             | 28%         | 27%         | 41%         | 32%         | 30%         | 33%         | 30%         | 37%         | 14%          | 46%          | 127%         |
| ROCE %                            | 39%         | 40%         | 41%         | 34%         | 35%         | 36%         | 31%         | 39%         | 17%          | 38%          | 72%          |
| Equity ratio                      | 65%         | 64%         | 52%         | 62%         | 58%         | 59%         | 58%         | 64%         | 27%          | 9%           | 12%          |
| Net gearing                       | -32%        | -32%        | -6%         | 0%          | -7%         | -25%        | -8%         | -23%        | -16%         | 17%          | 30%          |
| Net debt / EBITDA                 | -0.64       | -0.66       | -0.11       | 0.01        | -0.16       | -0.55       | -0.21       | -0.55       | -0.17        | 0.05         | 0.15         |
| EBITDA/net financial expenses     |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| <b>Share indicators</b>           |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |              |              |              |
| EPS (adjusted)                    |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.38         | 0.54         | 0.47         |
| DPS                               |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 0.69         | 0.44         | 0.15         |
| Equity / share                    |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | 1.18         | 0.32         | 0.33         |

Source: Reaktor and Inderes. The number of shares for 2023-25 has been adjusted to correspond to the number of shares after the share split executed on May 28, 2026. Further, the number of shares has been adjusted to correspond to the number of shares outstanding after stabilization measures related to the IPO.

# Estimates 1/3

## Estimate drivers

Due to the company's reporting structure, we still primarily estimate Reaktor's revenue through personnel and related billing rates and customer prices, as well as separately through license income. The company started reporting the Technology Solutions business and Software Product business separately, but we do not have comparative data or a broken-down personnel structure for this, which would enable forecasting by business area as well. However, due to the similar personnel-intensive nature of the Technology Solutions business and the Software Product business service turnover, the number of employees and billing rates serve as forecasting parameters, adjusted for licenses.

We estimate the Software Product business' license income separately. Here, we use the new NATO member countries as one parameter and the average license size (now 6 MEUR) as another parameter. Licensing income can naturally vary significantly between quarters, but from an annual perspective, we feel they provide an indication of the development. In addition to licensing income, the new NATO contract typically generates service revenue of around 30% annually, depending on the size of the license, for an average period of 5 years. This service revenue is naturally significantly more continuous in nature and improves predictability. As a result, we can finally also derive the segment-specific estimates separately (in the table on the next page). In terms of its profitability profile, we estimate that service revenue is in the range of 6-9% EBIT and that license revenue has very high margins. Thus, the Group's profitability potential is highly dependent on the relative share of license revenue. In license revenue, different customization needs of new customers affect the license margin. We understand that the licensing agreements already concluded have not


followed the current pricing model, which makes estimating even more challenging and uncertain. We have now estimated the license margin to be around 70%, and we will refine this as new license deals materialize and provide a better understanding of the potential. The large license deal in Q1'26 looks very profitable in light of the numbers.

The largest expense item in the cost structure is personnel costs, which are directly related to changes in the number of personnel, productivity, and wage inflation. Also, materials and services mainly consist of subcontracting costs directly tied to revenue. We forecast the third large expense item, other operating expenses, mainly relative to revenue growth.


We adjust earnings for restructuring expenses and events related to redeemable shares. In addition, we adjust for expenses related to exceptional projects, as these are related to the IPO or its preparations (IFRS transition). We are not adjusting for capital gains from associated companies (which we would normally do) because we see this as part of ongoing business operations. In Because it is reported below operating profit, it does not impair comparability with other companies' operational performance. We also do not adjust the license income of the Software Product business, as this is a core part of the business.

In the lower lines, the share of the profits of associated companies and joint ventures is recognized in the Group's income statement below EBIT based on the holding using the equity method. This is affected by both cash flow and change in value. Our estimates include only a cash flow assumption, which is based on an EBITDA of 9 MEUR and an average holding of 33%. In addition, profit before taxes is supported by returns from the strong cash position.

Liikevaihdon ja kannattavuuden kehitys



Revenue by business area



# Estimates 2/3

## 2026 good overall – now we look for signposts closer to the strategic targets

Reaktor's guidance expects improves earnings in 2026. It does not provide estimates on business profitability. We estimate revenue to grow 15% to 135 MEUR in 2026. Growth is fully organic. Excl. license revenue, we expect revenue to grow 8%. Reaktor has not provided comparison figures for the businesses. Geographically, we expect growth in most market areas.

In the software business, new NATO country contracts and particularly the recognition of the license portion of the contracts (8 MEUR) has driven growth. Reaktor doesn't expect license revenue to grow significantly in H2'26. The Software Product business is in an investment phase, which is reflected in negative profitability when adjusted for license revenue. We suspect that Reaktor continues to invest heavily in this business. The financial targets indicate that Reaktor aims for an EBIT margin of ~50% in the Software Product business in 2030, which reflects the targeted potential level.

We estimate that the more mature Technology Solutions business has grown moderately (2%) and better than the sector (Inderes 2026e listed IT services sector -3%). Growth in the Technology Solutions business is primarily driven by better billable utilization and, toward the end of the year, by recruitment. Reaktor has exceptionally good pricing power, which has historically been reflected in a high revenue per employee figure, and we expect this to remain strong.

In our view, the IT services market is partly polarized and/or at a turning point, particularly in Finland. The better economic outlook in Finland should support the IT services sector going forward. In our view, Reaktor clearly ranks among the winners in the sector, and the uncertainty is mainly related to the development of the "young/early" software product business and its growth rate. We estimate that the

Technology Solutions business has good potential for positive surprises relative to our estimates, supported by a recovering market.

We estimate that Reaktor's adjusted EBIT is 17.2 MEUR or 12.7% of revenue in 2026. Profitability has improved clearly from the comparison period (9.0%), driven mainly by high-margin license revenue. Reported earnings include a25 MEUR expense (in Q2), primarily related to the increase in the value of employee shares in connection with the IPO, and we adjust this from earnings. Our understanding is that the accounting appreciation related to the redemption of employee shares will weigh on the reported earnings in late 2026, which we estimate will be ~8 MEUR. This accounting item has no cash flow effect. In addition, we have adjusted the result for 3 MEUR in IPO-related expenses.

During Q2, Reaktor implemented a growth financing arrangement for the Krosswise group (comprising 61N, Forge, Invinite, and Krossflow), which is accounted for as an associated company. Reaktor continues to support the Group's growth as a significant minority owner with a 30% stake in Krosswise Oy. As a result of the transaction, the company recorded a sales gain of 2.2 MEUR in the earnings of associated and joint venture companies. Our estimates only include a cash flow assumption (no changes in value), which is based on an EBITDA of 9 MEUR and an average holding of 33%. Most of the companies report under FAS, and the default assumption is that the companies do not have major product development depreciation. Thus, in our estimates, the cash flow-based result of associated companies is around 3 MEUR on an annual basis.

We estimate the adjusted earnings per share to be EUR 0.64 per share. In addition, we expect the company to pay a dividend of EUR 0.18 per share, which corresponds to 28% of the adjusted result (target 20-40% of the result).

| Income statement metrics                                              | 2026e | 2027e | 2028e | 2029e | 2030e |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Revenue                                                               | 134.9 | 145.6 | 155.7 | 169.5 | 180.1 |
| Change in revenue %                                                   | 15%   | 8%    | 7%    | 9%    | 6%    |
| Technology Solutions business' revenue                                | 120.1 | 124.6 | 131.1 | 137.4 | 143.5 |
| Technology Solutions business' revenue growth, %                      | 2%    | 4%    | 5%    | 5%    | 4%    |
| Adj. EBIT of the Technology Solutions business                        |       | 8.7   | 9.8   | 11.0  | 12.2  |
| Adj. EBIT-% of the Technology Solutions business                      |       | 7.0%  | 7.5%  | 8.0%  | 8.5%  |
| Software Product business' revenue                                    | 14.8  | 21.0  | 24.6  | 32.1  | 36.6  |
| Software Product business, growth                                     |       | 42%   | 17%   | 30%   | 14%   |
| Software Product business' share in the group's revenue               |       |       |       |       |       |
| Share of services, 30% of the license for 5 years                     | 7.2   | 9.0   | 12.6  | 17.1  | 21.6  |
| Growth-% of Software Product business' service revenue                |       | 26%   | 40%   | 36%   | 26%   |
| EBIT % of Software Product business' service revenue                  |       | 3%    | 4%    | 5%    | 6%    |
| Share of license                                                      | 7.6   | 12    | 12    | 15    | 15    |
| License growth %                                                      |       | 58%   | 0%    | 25%   | 0%    |
| License adj. EBIT-%                                                   |       | 70%   | 75%   | 75%   | 75%   |
| Adj. EBIT of the Software Product business                            |       | 8.7   | 9.5   | 12.1  | 12.5  |
| Adj. EBIT-% of the Software Product business                          |       | 41%   | 39%   | 38%   | 34%   |
| The contracts have an average value of 6 MEUR and a length of 5 years | 1.0   | 5.0   | 7.0   | 9.5   | 12.0  |
| New contracts, number                                                 | 3.0   | 2.0   | 2.0   | 2.5   | 2.5   |
| New NATO or other Member States                                       | 3     | 2     | 2     | 3     | 3     |
| NATO or other Member States, total                                    | 4     | 6     | 8     | 11    | 13    |
| Adj. EBIT in total                                                    | 17.2  | 17.4  | 19.3  | 23.1  | 24.7  |
| Adj. EBIT-%                                                           | 12.7% | 11.9% | 12.4% | 13.6% | 13.7% |

# Estimates 3/3

## Strategy period is a proving ground for software products

We estimate Reaktor to grow by 7-9% annually during the strategy period, in 2027-2030. In our estimates, growth is driven by the Software Products business (42%-14%), to which the key downside and upside estimate risks are related. Software Product business' revenue will be 37 MEUR in 2030, which is clearly below the target of 60-90 MEUR. Estimating the software product business is still very challenging, as it is backed by a track record of only two quarters of the competitiveness of the business. For the technology solutions business, we expect moderate and clearly lower-risk revenue growth of 4-5%, which is below the company's target of 8-12%. In our estimates, this allows the company to reach revenue of 144 MEUR in the Technology Solutions business by the end of the strategy period. Geographically, growth is likely to be driven by international markets in the longer term.

For profitability, we expect the adj. EBIT margin to remain at the same level as in 2026e, meaning 12-14% in 2027-2030. We estimate Technology Solutions' EBIT margin to be 7-9%, which is below the target of 10-12%. In addition, we estimate the EBIT-% of the Software Product business to be 30-40%, which is heavily dependent on license revenue and its margin structure. Thus, we expect the EBIT of the Software Product business to be 13 MEUR in 2030, which is clearly below the company's target of 30 MEUR.

We expect Reaktor to pay 20-40% of earnings as dividends and use the remainder for acquisitions. Our current estimates do not consider acquisitions that the company could well make. In the final paragraph, we have roughly estimated how much revenue the company could acquire through M&A during the strategy period based on current estimates.

## Long-term estimates


In the long term, we expect growth to be 4-6%, with a 1.5%

terminal growth assumption. We expect the EBIT margin to remain at 13% and decrease to 11% in the terminal. Our estimates are somewhat cautious, as they fall below this year's level for growth and profitability, and if the company succeeds even partially in the Software Product business, there is clear upside potential in the estimates. Cautious estimates are warranted by the still sparse track record of the Software Product business.

## Potential impact of acquisitions

Historically, Reaktor has not made major acquisitions, but numerous smaller Ecosystem business transactions. We expect the company to be active in the acquisition market in the future, which is also indicated by the funds raised in the company's IPO and its statements. The company has a strong cash position, good cash flow, and debt leverage at its disposal. With the cash and cash flow, we estimate that the company has roughly 80 MEUR available, and with financial leverage, 60 MEUR (net debt/EBITDA of 2x at the end of the strategy period). In addition, the use of own shares as a means of payment provides plenty of leeway.

In the table on the right, we outline how much capital buying revenue growth would require. The assumption is that the target company has strong expertise, and healthy, growing, and profitable business operations, which also makes the valuation of the acquisition target higher than the sector average. The median EV/S ratio of international peers is 1.4x, Finnish peers 0.7x, and Reaktor's 0.9x. We assume the valuation of the acquisition targets to be ~1.2x, and the company would, finance the transaction primarily with cash or debt. Thus, the company should have a good opportunity in terms of capital – supported by cash on hand, cash flow, and debt – to acquire well over 100 MEUR of revenue. The question is more whether the company can find a high enough level of expertise and suitable targets.



|                               |     | How much revenue can be acquired |      |      |      |      |      |
|-------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                               |     | Valuation                        |      |      |      |      |      |
|                               |     | EV/S                             |      |      |      |      |      |
| Capital used for acquisitions |     | 0.8x                             | 1.0x | 1.2x | 1.4x | 1.6x | 1.8x |
|                               | 80  | 100                              | 80   | 67   | 57   | 50   | 44   |
|                               | 100 | 125                              | 100  | 83   | 71   | 63   | 56   |
|                               | 120 | 150                              | 120  | 100  | 86   | 75   | 67   |
|                               | 140 | 175                              | 140  | 117  | 100  | 88   | 78   |
|                               | 160 | 200                              | 160  | 133  | 114  | 100  | 89   |
|                               | 180 | 225                              | 180  | 150  | 129  | 113  | 100  |

# Income statement

| Income statement                   | 2023 | 2024 | Q1'25 | Q2'25 | H1'25 | H2'25 | 2025 | Q1'26 | Q2'26 | Q3'26e | Q4'26e | H1'26 | H2'26e | 2026e | 2027e | 2028e | 2029e |
|------------------------------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Revenue                            | 120  | 117  | 29.9  | 29.0  | 58.9  | 58.8  | 118  | 39.1  | 32.3  | 29.1   | 34.4   | 71.3  | 63.5   | 135   | 146   | 156   | 169   |
| EBITDA                             | 15.0 | 13.5 | 2.7   | 1.8   | 4.4   | 7.7   | 12.2 | 10.1  | -22.9 | 2.5    | 3.5    | -12.8 | 6.0    | -6.8  | 21.6  | 23.7  | 27.5  |
| Depreciation                       | -4.4 | -4.1 | -1.0  | -1.0  | -2.0  | -2.0  | -4.0 | -1.0  | -1.0  | -1.0   | -1.0   | -2.0  | -2.0   | -4.0  | -4.2  | -4.4  | -4.4  |
| EBIT (excl. NRI)                   | 13.8 | 12.4 | 2.2   | 1.0   | 3.2   | 7.4   | 10.6 | 10.4  | 2.3   | 2.0    | 2.5    | 12.7  | 4.5    | 17.2  | 17.4  | 19.3  | 23.1  |
| EBIT                               | 10.6 | 9.4  | 1.7   | 0.8   | 2.4   | 5.7   | 8.1  | 9.1   | -24.0 | 1.5    | 2.5    | -14.9 | 4.0    | -10.9 | 17.4  | 19.3  | 23.1  |
| Share of profits in assoc. compan. | -5.5 | -1.9 | 0.6   | 0.1   | 0.7   | 0.6   | 1.3  | 0.2   | 3.0   | 0.7    | 0.7    | 3.2   | 1.5    | 4.7   | 3.0   | 3.1   | 3.3   |
| Net financial items                | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.3  | -0.2  | -0.4  | -0.1  | -0.5 | 0.1   | 0.1   | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.2   | 0.2    | 0.4   | -0.1  | 0.0   | 0.1   |
| PTP                                | 4.8  | 7.4  | 2.0   | 0.7   | 2.7   | 6.2   | 8.9  | 9.4   | -20.8 | 2.3    | 3.4    | -11.4 | 5.7    | -5.7  | 20.3  | 22.5  | 26.5  |
| Taxes                              | -1.9 | -1.8 | -0.3  | 0.0   | -0.2  | -0.9  | -1.1 | -2.0  | 0.3   | -0.5   | -0.7   | -1.7  | -1.1   | -2.9  | -3.5  | -3.9  | -4.6  |
| Net earnings                       | 2.9  | 5.6  | 1.7   | 0.7   | 2.5   | 5.3   | 7.8  | 7.4   | -20.5 | 1.9    | 2.7    | -13.2 | 4.6    | -8.6  | 16.8  | 18.6  | 21.8  |
| EPS (adj.)                         | 0.38 | 0.54 | 0.10  | 0.04  | 0.15  | 0.33  | 0.47 | 0.34  | 0.10  | 0.09   | 0.11   | 0.45  | 0.20   | 0.64  | 0.66  | 0.73  | 0.86  |
| EPS (rep.)                         | 0.18 | 0.35 | 0.08  | 0.03  | 0.11  | 0.25  | 0.36 | 0.29  | -0.81 | 0.07   | 0.11   | -0.52 | 0.18   | -0.34 | 0.66  | 0.73  | 0.86  |

| Key figures            | 2023   | 2024   | Q1'25  | Q2'25  | H1'25  | H2'25   | 2025    | Q1'26   | Q2'26   | Q3'26e  | Q4'26e  | H1'26   | H2'26e  | 2026e  | 2027e  | 2028e  | 2029e  |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Revenue growth-%       | 2.6 %  | -2.8 % | -6.4 % | -6.0 % | -6.2 % | 8.8 %   | 0.7 %   | 30.6 %  | 11.4 %  | 6.9 %   | 8.9 %   | 21.1 %  | 8.0 %   | 14.6 % | 7.9 %  | 7.0 %  | 8.8 %  |
| Adjusted EBIT growth-% |        | -9.9 % |        |        |        | -40.2 % | -14.7 % | 371.4 % | 135.8 % | 181.6 % | -74.5 % | 299.8 % | -39.5 % | 62.1 % | 1.3 %  | 11.2 % | 19.4 % |
| EBITDA-%               | 12.5 % | 11.5 % | 8.9 %  | 6.1 %  | 7.5 %  | 13.2 %  | 10.3 %  | 25.8 %  | -71.1 % | 8.5 %   | 10.2 %  | -18.0 % | 9.4 %   | -5.1 % | 14.9 % | 15.2 % | 16.2 % |
| Adjusted EBIT-%        | 11.4 % | 10.6 % | 7.4 %  | 3.3 %  | 5.4 %  | 12.6 %  | 9.0 %   | 26.6 %  | 7.0 %   | 6.8 %   | 7.3 %   | 17.8 %  | 7.1 %   | 12.7 % | 11.9 % | 12.4 % | 13.6 % |
| Net earnings-%         | 2.4 %  | 4.8 %  | 5.7 %  | 2.5 %  | 4.2 %  | 9.1 %   | 6.6 %   | 18.9 %  | -63.6 % | 6.4 %   | 7.8 %   | -18.4 % | 7.2 %   | -6.4 % | 11.6 % | 12.0 % | 12.9 % |

Source: Inderes.

# Investment profile

- 1 An interesting combination of 1) high-quality, growing and profitable IT services business of excellent quality...
- 2 ... 2) early-stage and highly scalable Software Product business...
- 3 ... 3) VC fund-type Ecosystem business, which offers strong value creation potential and synergies
- 4 Strong cash assets, cash flow, and debt leverage provide ample leeway for organic investments and acquisitions
- 5 Good medium- and long-term growth fundamentals in the market

## Potential

- Nicely growing markets in the medium and long term
- Success in the software product business and its scalability
- Expanding the Reaktor Ecosystem venture business and value creation
- Leveraging strong expertise and an attractive company culture
- Continued internationalization
- Value creation through organic growth and acquisitions
- Easing AI fears

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## Risks

- Maintaining culture and employer image as the company is public and its structure changes. In addition, the strong desire to grow inevitably brings new cultures, and the risk is related to how they are approached.
- Failure in the Software Product business
- The limited liquidity of the stock, combined with the potential selling pressure from long-term owners
- The disruptive threat of AI
- Risks related to large clients
- Acquisitions (no history and risks in cultural integration)
- Weakening market conditions, wage inflation and attrition

# Valuation 1/5

## Investment profile

In terms of its investment profile, Reaktor is an earnings grower. In terms of its business, the company is an interesting combination of 1) stable earnings growth in traditional IT service consulting, 2) early-stage Software Product business with strong growth and scalability, and 3) a highly interesting VC-fund-type Ecosystem business that distinguishes it from the listed sector and has strong synergies and value creation potential.

Revenue growth will be organic and inorganic. Reaktor will likely use a large portion of its cash and cash flow in the coming years for investments in organic and inorganic growth. However, finding acquisition targets that meet Reaktor's high quality criteria can be challenging, and likely at least more expensive than the sector.

We estimate that value creation will be primarily based on organic growth, margin improvement, and the expansion of the Ecosystem business. The latter type of value creation is continuous, but its realization will primarily be seen only in the longer term through exits and the sale of holdings.

We believe the key risks relate to the dilution of the excellent employer image, which can be triggered by several different factors (strong organic growth introducing new cultures, acquisitions, listing-related matters). This would be reflected with a delay in revenue and profitability through weakened competitiveness. The listing better enables the realization of shares in an employee-owned company like Reaktor, which can sustain selling pressure for longer (this was clearly visible right after the listing as stabilization needs). In connection with its listing, Reaktor largely minimized this risk by selling employee-held shares. The shareholders include legacy owners who are better

positioned to sell only after the IPO, and the risk is specifically associated with them.

## Valuation

The valuation methods we generally apply in the IT services sector are also well-suited for Reaktor. In the valuation, we apply valuation multiples, relative valuation, a sum-of-the-parts model, and a cash flow calculation, and we also illustrate the valuation using the EV/S ratio and the Rule of 20. In the valuation, the difference to the rest of the sector is created by the Reaktor Ecosystem business, the impacts of which we discuss in more detail in each valuation section.

## Multiple-based valuation


In Reaktor's multiple-based valuation, we apply the P/E and EV/EBIT ratios. When interpreting the multiples, a few things should be considered. The market cap includes the value of the associated company holding. Investors pay for it as part of the stock price. Revenue and EBIT do not include associated companies, as their result is recorded below operating profit. Thus, the value of the associated companies (Inderes 34 MEUR, calculation detailed on page 56) is once again deducted from the EV. If they were not deducted, EV/EBIT would compare a value that includes associated companies to earnings that do not include them. The multiple would appear too high.

When applying multiples, we feel the best year is 2026, as it already incorporates the completed license deals. The estimates for next year include a similar number of license deals, but these are subject to clear estimate uncertainty.

Reaktor's P/E ratios for 2026-2027 are 11x, and the EV/EBIT ratios are 6-7x, which also indicates that earnings growth expectations for 2027 are moderate. Due to Reaktor's

| Valuation level            | 2026e | 2027e | 2028e | 2029e |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Share price                | 6.95  | 6.95  | 6.95  | 6.95  |
| Number of shares, millions | 25.5  | 25.5  | 25.5  | 25.5  |
| Market cap                 | 177   | 177   | 177   | 177   |
| Enterprise value (EV)      | 120   | 108   | 95    | 79    |
| P/E (adj.)                 | 10.8  | 10.5  | 9.5   | 8.1   |
| P/E                        | neg.  | 10.5  | 9.5   | 8.1   |
| P/B                        | 3.6   | 2.9   | 2.4   | 1.9   |
| P/S                        | 1.3   | 1.2   | 1.1   | 1.0   |
| EV/Sales                   | 0.9   | 0.7   | 0.6   | 0.5   |
| EV/EBITDA                  | neg.  | 5.0   | 4.0   | 2.9   |
| EV/EBIT (adj.)             | 7.0   | 6.2   | 4.9   | 3.4   |
| Dividend/earnings (%)      | neg.  | 30.0% | 30.0% | 30.0% |
| Dividend yield-%           | 2.6%  | 2.9%  | 3.2%  | 3.7%  |

Source: Inderes



# Valuation 2/5

recent listing, there are no historical multiples available to mirror the valuation against. The 2026 median P/E ratio for Nasdaq Helsinki, based on Inderes' estimates, is 13.5x. Reflecting the valuation of Nasdaq Helsinki and Reaktor's relative earnings growth potential, we find the valuation at least attractive. The sustainability of the earnings level relies heavily on license deals in the Software Product business, which are subject to uncertainty. For Reaktor, we accept a 2026 P/E multiple of 12-14x, which corresponds to a value of approximately EUR 7.7-9.0 per share.

## Peer group

We use IT service companies listed in Finland and the Nordic countries, as well as global IT service companies, as the peer group. Reaktor's Ecosystem associate company Witted is also in the peer group. We believe Reaktor's competitive differentiators are related to the business structure (Ecosystem business) as well as the business and delivery models (Software Product business). Compared to Finnish companies, a relatively large share of Reaktor's revenue is generated internationally.

We feel the peer group provides a good framework in a normal market environment. Now, however, almost all companies in the sector in Finland are undergoing some scale of transformation or facing challenges, which makes using a peer group more difficult, particularly for 2026 and partly also for 2027.

In general, we still find IT service companies to be an interesting sector to own due to the industry's good demand fundamentals in the medium term and low absolute valuation levels. However, we expect the winners and losers in the sector to become more clearly separated going forward, and Reaktor clearly belongs among the

winners. In the peer group, we have used Inderes' estimates for the companies we cover, which takes into account goodwill amortization and improves comparability between IT service companies.

In our view, comparing the company to international digital-era peers is more justified than comparing it to other Finnish peers due to the relatively high weight of Reaktor's international business (2025: 38% of revenue), its successful expansion, and its strategic focus.

At 2026e P/E and EV/EBIT multiples, Reaktor is valued at ~30% below the entire peer group as well as international and Finnish peers. However, it is worth noting here that Reaktor's earnings level is close to a "peak", while a large part of the peer group is under varying degrees of earnings pressure, which weakens comparability. On corresponding 2027 multiples, the valuation gap is slightly narrower, yet still clear (just under 30%). Overall, the company's relative valuation can also be considered at least attractive.

In a "normal" earnings environment for the peer group, we believe a clear premium over Finnish peers is justified from a growth and profitability perspective that are "generally" better than the sector's. Using the median multiples of Finnish peers, Reaktor's share value would be EUR 7.5-9.5.

## Sector valuation measured by the Rule of 20

We also examine the valuation of sector companies using the Rule of 20, we have introduced (organic growth % + EBITA %), and compare this to the EV/S multiple. A nearly identical valuation comparison has been used for SaaS companies. In our view, this serves as an interesting angle to look at the sector's valuation levels.

| Peer group valuation<br>Company | Market<br>cap | EV/EBIT     |             | P/E         |             |
|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                 | MEUR          | 2026e       | 2027e       | 2026e       | 2027e       |
| Digia*                          | 131           | 7.2         | 6.0         | 8.5         | 7.7         |
| Digital Workforce*              | 29            | 20.0        | 10.1        | 27.3        | 9.3         |
| Gofore*                         | 194           | 10.7        | 8.7         | 14.4        | 12.3        |
| Netum Group*                    | 11            |             | 26.5        |             | 51.1        |
| Siili Solutions*                | 21            | 14.7        | 8.4         | 41.9        | 10.2        |
| Solteq*                         | 6             | 22.7        | 15.0        |             |             |
| Tieto                           | 2188          | 9.2         | 9.9         | 12.1        | 11.6        |
| Vincit*                         | 14            |             | 7.4         |             | 11.1        |
| Witted Megacorp*                | 23            | 8.2         | 6.7         | 14.0        | 11.7        |
| Bouvet                          | 515           | 12.3        | 11.2        | 15.8        | 14.1        |
| CombinedX                       | 44            | 1.4         | 4.0         | 3.5         | 11.2        |
| Knowit                          | 296           | 29.4        | 16.6        | 32.1        | 20.1        |
| Netcompany Group                | 2387          | 20.0        | 15.3        | 22.1        | 16.8        |
| Epam Systems Inc                | 6273          | 7.1         | 6.8         | 10.4        | 9.7         |
| Endava PLC                      | 103           | 5.8         | 5.2         | 3.4         | 2.6         |
| Kainos Group PLC                | 1829          | 24.6        | 19.0        | 33.4        | 25.7        |
| Globant SA                      | 1735          | 7.0         | 6.6         | 7.6         | 7.3         |
| Accenture PLC                   | 131545        | 12.6        | 11.8        | 18.0        | 17.0        |
| IBM                             | 213886        | 20.1        | 18.0        | 20.4        | 19.2        |
| CGI Inc                         | 15139         | 10.1        | 9.7         | 12.8        | 11.7        |
| Wipro Ltd                       | 17656         | 11.1        | 10.3        | 15.0        | 14.4        |
| <b>Reaktor Group (Inderes)</b>  | <b>177</b>    | <b>7.0</b>  | <b>6.2</b>  | <b>10.8</b> | <b>10.5</b> |
| <b>Median</b>                   |               | <b>11.0</b> | <b>10.1</b> | <b>15.3</b> | <b>12.0</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>         |               | -36%        | -39%        | -29%        | -13%        |
| <b>Median Finnish</b>           |               | <b>10.7</b> | <b>8.7</b>  | <b>14.2</b> | <b>11.3</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>         |               | -35%        | -28%        | -24%        | -7%         |
| <b>Median International</b>     |               | <b>11.1</b> | <b>10.4</b> | <b>15.7</b> | <b>14.5</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>         |               | -37%        | -40%        | -31%        | -27%        |

Source: Refinitiv / Inderes

# Valuation 3/5

For the comparison, we used the 2026 estimates for the companies we cover In the comparison, Reaktor is valued slightly below the fair value line of the valuation method, which indicates a small upside. However, 2026 will be Reaktor's best year (27) since 2021 (27 based on the "Rule of 20") and clearly above the average of the previous four years (10). We expect the company to remain at a healthy 20% level in the coming years as well, which would imply an acceptable EV/S multiple of 0.90-0.95x for those years. Based on 2027 estimates, this corresponds to a value of around EUR 8 per share.

## Valuation of the Reaktor Ecosystem business

In the valuation of the Ecosystem business, only those Ecosystem associated companies that are not consolidated as subsidiaries in Reaktor's consolidated financial statements are included. Consolidated companies are not included in this valuation. In 2025, the combined revenue of the Ecosystem associated companies was 200 MEUR and EBITDA was 8 MEUR Ecosystem business EBITDA is assumed to be primarily under FAS accounting (rental costs are operational expenses in FAS), meaning it is more comparable with the sector's adj. EBIT.

In our base valuation scenario, we use the median EV/S and EV/EBIT multiples of the sector's Finnish listed peers and the actual figures for the Ecosystem business for 2025. We have also outlined a weak and a strong scenario from a valuation perspective in the table on the right.


However, the large Ecosystem associated company Witted, is only valued at an EV/S multiple of 0.3x on Nasdaq, which is clearly below the applied valuation (EV/S 0.7x\*(1-30% discount)=~0.5x). It is therefore justified to examine the valuation of the Ecosystem business excluding Witted.

The investment company and VC discount is often 20-50%, mainly due to illiquidity, a minority position, and valuation risk. In our view, however, the majority of the Ecosystem business' revenue and earnings already comes from larger, more mature companies, so we feel the applicable discount is justified to be kept at the lower end of the valuation range. Sevendos and Witted accounted for 35% and 26% of revenue in 2025. The others are clearly smaller companies with revenue of under 10 MEUR Thus, we apply a 30% discount to the valuation of Finnish companies.

Based on valuation multiples, we thus estimate the value of the Reaktor Ecosystem business at 31 MEUR (25-36 MEUR) We assume in the calculation that the companies are practically debt-free. The value calculated using the cash flow method for the Reaktor Ecosystem business is, in turn, 37.4 MEUR. This means that the average of the two methods is 34 MEUR.

At the end of 2025, the fair value of the portfolio on Reaktor's balance sheet was 47 MEUR (an assessment commissioned by the company and conducted by an external appraiser), which is 3.6x the book value (13 MEUR). Thus, it can be stated that the Reaktor Ecosystem business has performed well and been a successful business, also from the perspective of our own valuation, even though our estimate remains below the value on Reaktor's balance sheet. In addition, we see no reason why the value creation of the business in question would not continue.

However, the value realization of the Reaktor Ecosystem business cannot be expected all at once, but rather materializes gradually. At the same time, the company also continuously invests in it.



| Ecosystem valuation, scenario | Below the sector | Sector median | Above the sector |
|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|
| EV/S                          | 0.5              | 0.7           | 0.9              |
| EV using 200 MEUR revenue     | 98               | 138           | 178              |
| EV/EBIT                       | 8.7              | 10.7          | 12.7             |
| EV using EBITDA 8 MEUR        | 70               | 86            | 102              |
| EV average                    | 84               | 112           | 140              |
| EV, with 33% holding          | 28               | 37            | 47               |
| with 30% unlisted discount    | 20               | 26            | 33               |

|                                                                    |     |      |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------|------|
| Witted excluded from figures (revenue 53 MEUR and EBITDA 0.3 MEUR) |     |      |      |
| EV/S                                                               | 0.5 | 0.7  | 0.9  |
| EV using 147 MEUR revenue                                          | 72  | 102  | 131  |
| EV/EBIT                                                            | 8.7 | 10.7 | 12.7 |
| EV using EBITDA 7.7 MEUR                                           | 67  | 83   | 98   |
| EV average                                                         | 70  | 92   | 115  |
| EV, with 33% holding                                               | 23  | 31   | 38   |
| + Witted EV                                                        | 42  | 50   | 57   |
| with 30% unlisted discount                                         | 30  | 35   | 40   |
| EV average from above                                              | 25  | 31   | 36   |
| DCF value for the Ecosystem business                               | 37  |      |      |

# Valuation 4/5

## Sum of the parts

In the sum-of-the-parts calculation, we value Reaktor's three parts separately: TechnologySolutions business (consulting), Software Product business, and Ecosystem associated companies. The more detailed parameters used in the calculation can be found in the table on the next page.

**Technology Solutions business – We value** the consulting business using the 2027e adjusted EBIT and the peer EV/EBIT multiple (10.1x). We do not apply a premium or discount to the multiple. The debt-free value of the Technology Solutions business is 88 MEUR.

**Software Product business – The development of the Software Product business** involves high uncertainty, so we value it through three 2030e scenarios. In the weak scenario, revenue is 15 MEUR and adj. EBIT 15%, in the baseline scenario 37 MEUR and 34%, and in the strong scenario 75 MEUR and 38%. We value the 2030e EBIT using an EV/EBIT multiple of 12x and discount the value to the present day with a 15% required return. The EV weighted by scenario probabilities (20/60/20%) is 91 MEUR.

**Ecosystem associated companies and the bridge to equity value** – The 34 MEUR value of the Ecosystem associated companies is the average of the multiple-based valuation (31 MEUR) and the DCF model (37 MEUR).

To the debt-free value of the operational businesses of 179 MEUR, we add associated companies, cash assets, and the proceeds from the share issue (20 MEUR), and deduct interest-bearing liabilities and the payable dividend.

The combined equity value of the parts is 228 MEUR, or EUR 8.94 per share, which is 29% above the current share

price of EUR 6.95. The Technology Solutions business and the Software Product business each account for around 40% of the value (41% and 43%), and Ecosystem associated companies account for 16%. The calculation is sensitive to the performance of the Software Product business: in a weak scenario, the sum of the parts would be EUR ~6.0 per share, which is below the current share price, and in a strong scenario, around EUR 12.8. The sensitivity analysis can be found on the next page.

The usability of the sum-of-the-parts is weakened by the fact that evidence of the Software Product business' competitiveness is still thin. In a year or two, when we have a better understanding of the competitiveness of this business, the sum of the parts can be applied more strongly as one perspective. However, we do not expect the company to separate the businesses into independent companies, as the synergies are obvious. Thus, the applicability of this valuation method is more indicative, as any potential hidden undervaluation from this perspective would likely not be unlocked.

| 4. Sum of the parts and bridge to equity value  | MEUR         | Share |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| Technology Solutions business                   | 88.4         | 41.5% |
| Software Product Business                       | 91.0         | 42.7% |
| <b>Enterprise value, operational businesses</b> | <b>179.4</b> |       |
| - Interest-bearing liabilities                  | (6.4)        |       |
| + Cash and cash equivalents                     | 4.3          |       |
| + Share issue                                   | 20.0         |       |
| + Ecosystem associated companies                | 33.9         | 15.9% |
| - Minority interest                             | -            |       |
| - Dividend/return of capital                    | (3.5)        |       |
| <b>Equity value (SOTP)</b>                      | <b>227.7</b> |       |
| Number of shares, millions                      | 25.458       |       |
| <b>SOTP value per share, EUR</b>                | <b>8.94</b>  |       |
| Comparison: DCF per share (O-DCF), EUR          | 9.21         |       |
| Share price, EUR                                | 6.95         |       |
| Upside (+) / downside (–) to SOTP value         | 28.7%        |       |

# Sum of the parts and sensitivity of the Software business

## 1. Technology Solutions business (consulting) – EV/EBIT ratio

|                                                    |             |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Adj. EBIT 2027e                                    | 8.7         |
| Peer group EV/EBIT 2027e, median (Finnish)         | 8.7x        |
| Peer group EV/EBIT 2027e, median (all, comparison) | 10.1x       |
| Premium (+) / discount (-) to peers                | -           |
| Selected EV/EBIT                                   | 10.1x       |
| <b>Technology Solutions EV</b>                     | <b>88.4</b> |

## 2. Software Product business – scenarios 2030e

|                                                            | Weak        | Baseline<br>(Inderes) | Strong |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Revenue 2030e                                              | 15.0        | 36.6                  | 75.0   |
| Adj. EBIT-% 2030e                                          | 15.0%       | 34.3%                 | 37.5%  |
| Adj. EBIT 2030e                                            | 2.3         | 12.5                  | 28.1   |
| Likelihood                                                 | 20%         | 60%                   | 20%    |
| EV/EBIT exit ratio 2030e                                   | 12.0x       |                       |        |
| Required return (Software Products business)               | 15.0%       |                       |        |
| Years from the valuation date to the end of 2030e          | 4.18        |                       |        |
| Discount factor                                            | 0.557       |                       |        |
| EV at the end of 2030e                                     | 27.0        | 150.6                 | 337.5  |
| EV today (discounted)                                      | 15.0        | 83.9                  | 188.1  |
| <b>Software Products business EV, probability-weighted</b> | <b>91.0</b> |                       |        |

## 3. Ecosystem associated companies

|                                                               |           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Via Ecosystem's valuation multiples (see page 56 for details) | 30.4      |
| DCF model                                                     | 37.4      |
| <b>Average</b>                                                | <b>34</b> |

## 4. Sum of the parts and bridge to equity value

|                                                 | MEUR         | Share |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| Technology Solutions                            | 88.4         | 41.5% |
| Software Product Business                       | 91.0         | 42.7% |
| <b>Enterprise value, operational businesses</b> | <b>179.4</b> |       |
| - Interest-bearing liabilities                  | (6.4)        |       |
| + Cash and cash equivalents                     | 4.3          |       |
| + Share issue                                   | 20.0         |       |
| + Ecosystem associated companies                | 33.9         | 15.9% |
| - Minority interest                             | -            |       |
| - Dividend/return of capital                    | (3.5)        |       |
| <b>Equity value (SOTP)</b>                      | <b>227.7</b> |       |
| Number of shares, millions                      | 25.458       |       |
| <b>SOTP value per share, EUR</b>                | <b>8.94</b>  |       |
| Comparison: DCF per share (O-DCF), EUR          | 9.21         |       |
| Share price, EUR                                | 6.95         |       |
| Upside (+) / downside (-) to SOTP value         | 28.7%        |       |

## 5. Sensitivity: SOTP value per share (EUR), Software Product business revenue × EBIT-% 2030e

| Revenue 2030e ↓ / EBIT % → |    | 24.3% | 29.3% | 34.3% | 39.3% | 44.3% |
|----------------------------|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                            | 17 | 6.43  | 6.65  | 6.86  | 7.08  | 7.30  |
|                            | 27 | 7.07  | 7.42  | 7.77  | 8.11  | 8.46  |
|                            | 37 | 7.70  | 8.18  | 8.67  | 9.15  | 9.63  |
|                            | 47 | 8.34  | 8.95  | 9.57  | 10.18 | 10.79 |
|                            | 57 | 8.98  | 9.72  | 10.47 | 11.21 | 11.95 |
|                            | 67 | 9.62  | 10.49 | 11.37 | 12.24 | 13.12 |
|                            | 77 | 10.26 | 11.26 | 12.27 | 13.27 | 14.28 |

## 6. Sensitivity: SOTP value per share (EUR), exit multiple × required return (probability-weighted)

| EV/EBIT 2030e ↓ / required return → |       | 13.0% | 14.0% | 15.0% | 16.0% | 17.0% |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                     | 8.0x  | 7.93  | 7.84  | 7.75  | 7.67  | 7.59  |
|                                     | 10.0x | 8.57  | 8.46  | 8.35  | 8.24  | 8.14  |
|                                     | 12.0x | 9.22  | 9.08  | 8.94  | 8.82  | 8.69  |
|                                     | 14.0x | 9.86  | 9.69  | 9.54  | 9.39  | 9.25  |
|                                     | 16.0x | 10.50 | 10.31 | 10.13 | 9.96  | 9.80  |

# Valuation 5/5

## DCF calculation

In the cash flow model, associated companies are taken into account through the cash flows we estimate they will generate and the discounting of these flows. In addition, the 2026 cash flow includes one-off elements of 45 MEUR related to a non-cash adjustment item (25 MEUR) and the share issue (20 MEUR).

We estimate organic growth of 7-9% in 2026-30, with growth then gradually decreasing towards a terminal growth rate of 1.5%. In addition, we assume the EBIT margin to average just under 13% in 2027-2030, before gradually decreasing to 11% in the terminal. We have used a WACC of 11.3%, with a return on equity of 12.1%. In our view, the relatively high required return is warranted due to the uncertainty in the Software Product business estimates. The terminal period's share of value is again low (40%), which is largely due to low growth and profitability assumptions in the terminal period. Overall, our DCF model gives the share a value of EUR 9.2, indicating that the stock is even very attractively priced in the long term.

## Components of the expected return for the share

We examine the expected return for Reaktor's stock based on earnings growth, dividend yield, and the accepted valuation multiples. We believe the company has the potential for ~7% annual earnings growth in the coming years (relative to the 2026e level), supported by revenue growth and profitability. With our dividend estimates, which are ~30% of EPS, the dividend yield is ~3%. The company's strong cash flow provides good preconditions for a relatively high distribution of profits, but the company targets a relatively low (20-40%) dividend payout ratio and invests organically and through acquisitions. In addition, we find the stock's valuation level (2026e) at the very least attractive. Thus, the

annual expected return (~15%) consisting of expected earnings growth, dividend, and upside in multiples, exceeds the required return on equity.


## Valuation summary

Based on the valuation methods we applied (valuation multiples 2026e P/E 11x and EV/EBIT 7x, relative valuation ~30% below peers, sum-of-the-parts EUR 8.9, cash flow calculation EUR 9.2, expected return ~15%, and EUR 8 based on the EV/S multiple and the Rule of 20), the fair value range of the share is EUR 8-9.5. Due to the large earnings impact of the Software Product business and still thin evidence of competitiveness, we apply the lower end of the range. We initiate coverage of Reaktori with an Accumulate recommendation and a target price of EUR 8.3.

In our view, the market is currently pricing mainly the Technology Solutions business and the Ecosystem business, while the potential earnings of the Software Product business are valued at less than half of our base case at the current share price (when deducting the Ecosystem and Technology Solutions businesses and cash assets from the market cap). In our view, continued evidence of the development of the Software Product business will act as a clear catalyst for unwinding this undervaluation. In principle, an earnings level matching that of the current year alone is sufficient to prove the continuity of the Software Product business and that the current valuation is very attractive.

As a note, the current share price is below the IPO price of EUR 8.25 per share. We estimate that the post-listing price decline is, in a way, due to the natural, slight selling pressure typically seen in an expert-owned organization at an early stage, which should level off over time. We also briefly discussed this earlier in the report.

## Total shareholder return drivers 2026e–2028e




# DCF-calculation

| DCF model                               | 2025       | 2026e        | 2027e       | 2028e       | 2029e       | 2030e       | 2031e       | 2032e       | 2033e       | 2034e       | 2035e       | TERM        |
|-----------------------------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Revenue growth-%                        | 0.7 %      | 14.6 %       | 7.9 %       | 7.0 %       | 8.8 %       | 7.0 %       | 6.0 %       | 5.0 %       | 5.0 %       | 4.0 %       | 1.5 %       | 1.5 %       |
| EBIT-%                                  | 6.9 %      | -8.1 %       | 11.9 %      | 12.4 %      | 13.6 %      | 13.0 %      | 13.0 %      | 13.0 %      | 13.0 %      | 12.0 %      | 11.0 %      | 11.0 %      |
| <b>EBIT (operating profit)</b>          | <b>8.1</b> | <b>-10.9</b> | <b>17.4</b> | <b>19.3</b> | <b>23.1</b> | <b>23.6</b> | <b>25.0</b> | <b>26.2</b> | <b>27.5</b> | <b>26.4</b> | <b>24.6</b> |             |
| + Depreciation                          | 4.0        | 4.0          | 4.2         | 4.4         | 4.4         | 4.5         | 4.6         | 4.7         | 4.7         | 4.8         | 5.0         |             |
| - Paid taxes                            | -1.3       | -3.4         | -3.5        | -3.9        | -4.6        | -4.8        | -5.1        | -5.3        | -5.6        | -5.4        | -5.0        |             |
| - Tax, financial expenses               | -0.1       | -0.1         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |             |
| + Tax, financial income                 | 0.0        | 0.0          | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.2         |             |
| - Change in working capital             | -2.6       | 5.1          | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | -0.1        | 0.0         |             |
| <b>Operating cash flow</b>              | <b>8.2</b> | <b>-5.3</b>  | <b>18.0</b> | <b>19.7</b> | <b>22.7</b> | <b>23.2</b> | <b>24.5</b> | <b>25.6</b> | <b>26.6</b> | <b>25.9</b> | <b>24.7</b> |             |
| + Change in other long-term liabilities | 0.0        | 0.0          | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |             |
| - Gross CAPEX                           | -1.3       | -5.3         | -4.2        | -4.3        | -4.5        | -4.6        | -4.7        | -4.9        | -5.0        | -5.1        | -5.3        |             |
| <b>Free operating cash flow</b>         | <b>6.9</b> | <b>-10.5</b> | <b>13.8</b> | <b>15.4</b> | <b>18.2</b> | <b>18.6</b> | <b>19.7</b> | <b>20.7</b> | <b>21.6</b> | <b>20.7</b> | <b>19.4</b> |             |
| +/- Other                               | 0.0        | 45.1         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |             |
| FCFF                                    | 6.9        | 34.6         | 13.8        | 15.4        | 18.2        | 18.6        | 19.7        | 20.7        | 21.6        | 20.7        | 19.4        | 201         |
| <b>Discounted FCFF</b>                  |            | <b>33.9</b>  | <b>12.2</b> | <b>12.2</b> | <b>13.0</b> | <b>11.9</b> | <b>11.3</b> | <b>10.7</b> | <b>10.0</b> | <b>8.6</b>  | <b>7.3</b>  | <b>75.0</b> |
| Sum of FCFF present value               |            | 206          | 172         | 160         | 148         | 135         | 123         | 112         | 101         | 90.9        | 82.2        | 75.0        |
| <b>Enterprise value DCF</b>             |            | <b>206</b>   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| - Interest bearing debt                 |            | -6.4         |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| + Cash and cash equivalents             |            | 4.3          |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| + Associated companies                  |            | 34.0         |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| -Minorities                             |            | 0.0          |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| -Dividend/capital return                |            | -3.5         |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| <b>Equity value DCF</b>                 |            | <b>234</b>   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| <b>Equity value DCF per share</b>       |            | <b>9.2</b>   |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |


| WACC                                           |               |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Tax-% (WACC)                                   | 20.0 %        |
| Target debt ratio (D/(D+E))                    | 10.0 %        |
| Cost of debt                                   | 5.0 %         |
| Equity Beta                                    | 1.50          |
| Market risk premium                            | 4.75%         |
| Liquidity premium                              | 2.00%         |
| Risk free interest rate                        | 3.0 %         |
| <b>Cost of equity</b>                          | <b>12.1 %</b> |
| <b>Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)</b> | <b>11.3 %</b> |

Source: Inderes




# DCF sensitivity calculations and key assumptions in graphs


Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the WACC-%




Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the risk-free rate



Sensitivity of DCF to changes in the terminal EBIT margin



Growth and profitability assumptions in the DCF calculation



Source: Inderes. Note that the weight of the terminal value (%) is shown on an inverse scale for clarity.

# Peer group valuation

| Peer group valuation                                                                               | Market cap | EV         | EV/EBIT     |             | EV/EBITDA    |            | EV/S       |            | P/E         |             | Dividend yield-% |            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|------------|
| Company                                                                                            | MEUR       | MEUR       | 2026e       | 2027e       | 2026e        | 2027e      | 2026e      | 2027e      | 2026e       | 2027e       | 2026e            | 2027e      |
| Digia*                                                                                             | 131        | 146        | 7.2         | 6.0         | 6.2          | 5.1        | 0.7        | 0.6        | 8.5         | 7.7         | 4.3              | 4.7        |
| Digital Workforce*                                                                                 | 29         | 33         | 20.0        | 10.1        | 17.9         | 8.5        | 1.0        | 0.9        | 27.3        | 9.3         | 3.7              | 4.5        |
| Gofore*                                                                                            | 194        | 205        | 10.7        | 8.7         | 8.6          | 7.0        | 0.9        | 0.9        | 14.4        | 12.3        | 4.2              | 4.3        |
| Netum Group*                                                                                       | 11         | 21         |             | 26.5        |              | 15.2       | 0.7        | 0.7        |             | 51.1        |                  |            |
| Siili Solutions*  | 21         | 26         | 14.7        | 8.4         | 7.1          | 4.4        | 0.3        | 0.2        | 41.9        | 10.2        | 1.5              | 2.3        |
| Solteq*                                                                                            | 6          | 31         | 22.7        | 15.0        | 18.1         | 10.1       | 0.7        | 0.7        |             |             |                  |            |
| Tieto                                                                                              | 2188       | 2552       | 9.2         | 9.9         | 7.5          | 8.2        | 1.5        | 1.5        | 12.1        | 11.6        | 4.8              | 5.1        |
| Vincit*                                                                                            | 14         | 15         |             | 7.4         | 5.1          | 2.4        | 0.3        | 0.2        |             | 11.1        |                  | 4.9        |
| Witted Megacorp*                                                                                   | 23         | 18         | 8.2         | 6.7         | 8.4          | 6.5        | 0.3        | 0.3        | 14.0        | 11.7        | 3.2              | 4.4        |
| Bouvet                                                                                             | 515        | 531        | 12.3        | 11.2        | 10.0         | 9.2        | 1.4        | 1.3        | 15.8        | 14.1        | 6.5              | 6.5        |
| CombinedX                                                                                          | 44         | 20         | 1.4         | 4.0         | 1.1          | 2.3        | 0.3        | 0.3        | 3.5         | 11.2        |                  |            |
| Knowit                                                                                             | 296        | 343        | 29.4        | 16.6        | 8.2          | 6.7        | 0.7        | 0.7        | 32.1        | 20.1        | 2.0              | 2.6        |
| Netcompany Group                                                                                   | 2387       | 2949       | 20.0        | 15.3        | 14.8         | 11.9       | 2.3        | 2.1        | 22.1        | 16.8        |                  |            |
| Epam Systems Inc                                                                                   | 6273       | 5591       | 7.1         | 6.8         | 6.4          | 6.2        | 1.1        | 1.1        | 10.4        | 9.7         |                  |            |
| Endava PLC                                                                                         | 103        | 328        | 5.8         | 5.2         | 4.0          | 3.4        | 0.4        | 0.4        | 3.4         | 2.6         |                  |            |
| Kainos Group PLC                                                                                   | 1829       | 1730       | 24.6        | 19.0        | 22.0         | 17.2       | 3.4        | 2.7        | 33.4        | 25.7        | 2.2              | 2.4        |
| Globant SA                                                                                         | 1735       | 2097       | 7.0         | 6.6         | 5.2          | 4.9        | 1.0        | 1.0        | 7.6         | 7.3         |                  |            |
| Accenture PLC                                                                                      | 131545     | 130566     | 12.6        | 11.8        | 10.4         | 9.8        | 2.0        | 1.9        | 18.0        | 17.0        | 2.6              | 2.8        |
| IBM                                                                                                | 213886     | 261010     | 20.1        | 18.0        | 14.4         | 13.5       | 4.2        | 4.0        | 20.4        | 19.2        | 2.7              | 2.7        |
| CGI Inc                                                                                            | 15139      | 17501      | 10.1        | 9.7         | 8.2          | 8.0        | 1.7        | 1.6        | 12.8        | 11.7        | 0.6              | 0.7        |
| Wipro Ltd                                                                                          | 17656      | 15637      | 11.1        | 10.3        | 9.2          | 8.6        | 1.8        | 1.7        | 15.0        | 14.4        | 5.7              | 4.6        |
| <b>Reaktor Group (Inderes)</b>                                                                     | <b>177</b> | <b>120</b> | <b>7.0</b>  | <b>6.2</b>  | <b>-17.6</b> | <b>5.0</b> | <b>0.9</b> | <b>0.7</b> | <b>10.8</b> | <b>10.5</b> | <b>2.6</b>       | <b>2.9</b> |
| <b>Median</b>                                                                                      |            |            | <b>11.0</b> | <b>10.1</b> | <b>8.3</b>   | <b>8.0</b> | <b>1.0</b> | <b>1.0</b> | <b>15.3</b> | <b>12.0</b> | <b>2.7</b>       | <b>3.5</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>                                                                            |            |            | -36%        | -39%        | -311%        | -37%       | -12%       | -22%       | -29%        | -13%        | -3%              | -19%       |
| <b>Median Finnish</b>                                                                              |            |            | <b>10.7</b> | <b>8.7</b>  | <b>8.0</b>   | <b>7.0</b> | <b>0.7</b> | <b>0.7</b> | <b>14.2</b> | <b>11.3</b> | <b>3.9</b>       | <b>4.5</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>                                                                            |            |            | -35%        | -28%        | -321%        | -28%       | 29%        | 3%         | -24%        | -7%         | -34%             | -37%       |
| <b>Median International</b>                                                                        |            |            | <b>11.1</b> | <b>10.4</b> | <b>8.7</b>   | <b>8.3</b> | <b>1.5</b> | <b>1.4</b> | <b>15.7</b> | <b>14.5</b> | <b>2.2</b>       | <b>2.6</b> |
| <i>Diff-% to median</i>                                                                            |            |            | -37%        | -40%        | -301%        | -39%       | -42%       | -48%       | -31%        | -27%        | 17%              | 11%        |

Source: Refinitiv / Inderes

# Balance sheet

| Assets                     | 2024        | 2025        | 2026e       | 2027e       | 2028e       |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Non-current assets</b>  | <b>28.2</b> | <b>30.2</b> | <b>31.0</b> | <b>31.0</b> | <b>31.0</b> |
| Goodwill                   | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Intangible assets          | 0.5         | 0.6         | 0.6         | 0.6         | 0.7         |
| Tangible assets            | 8.9         | 6.3         | 6.3         | 6.2         | 6.2         |
| Associated companies       | 12.2        | 13.0        | 12.6        | 12.6        | 12.6        |
| Other investments          | 6.4         | 10.3        | 11.5        | 11.5        | 11.5        |
| Other non-current assets   | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Deferred tax assets        | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         | 0.1         |
| <b>Current assets</b>      | <b>28.7</b> | <b>29.4</b> | <b>58.0</b> | <b>69.7</b> | <b>85.3</b> |
| Inventories                | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Other current assets       | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Receivables                | 20.9        | 25.1        | 28.3        | 30.6        | 32.7        |
| Cash and equivalents       | 7.8         | 4.3         | 29.7        | 39.1        | 52.6        |
| <b>Balance sheet total</b> | <b>56.9</b> | <b>59.6</b> | <b>89.0</b> | <b>101</b>  | <b>116</b>  |

Source: Inderes

| Liabilities & equity           | 2024        | 2025        | 2026e       | 2027e       | 2028e       |
|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Equity</b>                  | <b>5.1</b>  | <b>7.2</b>  | <b>48.7</b> | <b>60.9</b> | <b>74.5</b> |
| Share capital                  | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Retained earnings              | 5.1         | 7.1         | 30.1        | 42.3        | 55.9        |
| Hybrid bonds                   | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Revaluation reserve            | 0.0         | 0.0         | 18.6        | 18.6        | 18.6        |
| Other equity                   | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Minorities                     | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| <b>Non-current liabilities</b> | <b>6.0</b>  | <b>3.2</b>  | <b>3.0</b>  | <b>3.0</b>  | <b>3.0</b>  |
| Deferred tax liabilities       | 0.7         | 0.5         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Provisions                     | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Interest bearing debt          | 5.3         | 2.7         | 3.0         | 3.0         | 3.0         |
| Convertibles                   | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| Other long term liabilities    | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         | 0.0         |
| <b>Current liabilities</b>     | <b>45.8</b> | <b>49.2</b> | <b>37.4</b> | <b>36.8</b> | <b>38.8</b> |
| Interest bearing debt          | 3.4         | 3.8         | 4.2         | 1.5         | 1.5         |
| Payables                       | 17.0        | 18.6        | 27.0        | 29.1        | 31.1        |
| Other current liabilities      | 25.4        | 26.8        | 6.2         | 6.2         | 6.2         |
| <b>Balance sheet total</b>     | <b>56.9</b> | <b>59.6</b> | <b>89.0</b> | <b>101</b>  | <b>116</b>  |

# Summary

| Income statement          | 2023  | 2024  | 2025  | 2026e | 2027e | Per share data           | 2023    | 2024   | 2025    | 2026e   | 2027e   |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| Revenue                   | 120.3 | 116.9 | 117.7 | 134.9 | 145.6 | EPS (reported)           | 0.18    | 0.35   | 0.36    | -0.34   | 0.66    |
| EBITDA                    | 15.0  | 13.5  | 12.2  | -6.8  | 21.6  | EPS (adj.)               | 0.38    | 0.54   | 0.47    | 0.64    | 0.66    |
| EBIT                      | 10.6  | 9.4   | 8.1   | -10.9 | 17.4  | OCF / share              |         |        |         | -0.21   | 0.71    |
| PTP                       | 4.8   | 7.4   | 8.9   | -5.7  | 20.3  | OFCF / share             |         |        |         | 1.36    | 0.54    |
| Net Income                | 2.9   | 5.6   | 7.8   | -8.6  | 16.8  | Book value / share       |         |        |         | 1.91    | 2.39    |
| Extraordinary items       | -3.2  | -3.1  | -2.5  | -28.0 | 0.0   | Dividend / share         | 0.69    | 0.44   | 0.15    | 0.18    | 0.00    |
| Balance sheet             | 2023  | 2024  | 2025  | 2026e | 2027e | Growth and profitability | 2023    | 2024   | 2025    | 2026e   | 2027e   |
| Balance sheet total       | 72.2  | 56.9  | 59.6  | 89.0  | 100.7 | Revenue growth-%         | 3%      | -3%    | 1%      | 15%     | 8%      |
| Equity capital            | 19.0  | 5.1   | 7.2   | 48.7  | 60.9  | EBITDA growth-%          | 15%     | -10%   | -10%    | -156%   | 416%    |
| Goodwill                  | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | EBIT (adj.) growth-%     | 12%     | -10%   | -15%    | 62%     | 1%      |
| Net debt                  | -3.1  | 0.9   | 2.1   | -22.5 | -34.6 | EPS (adj.) growth-%      |         | 44%    | -13%    | 36%     | 3%      |
| Cash flow                 | 2023  | 2024  | 2025  | 2026e | 2027e | EBITDA-%                 | 12.5 %  | 11.5 % | 10.3 %  | -5.1 %  | 14.9 %  |
| EBITDA                    | 15.0  | 13.5  | 12.2  | -6.8  | 21.6  | EBIT (adj.)-%            | 11.4 %  | 10.6 % | 9.0 %   | 12.7 %  | 11.9 %  |
| Change in working capital |       |       |       | 5.1   | -0.1  | EBIT-%                   | 8.8 %   | 8.0 %  | 6.9 %   | -8.1 %  | 11.9 %  |
| Operating cash flow       |       |       |       | -5.3  | 18.0  | ROE-%                    | 15.1 %  | 46.3 % | 126.8 % | -30.8 % | 30.7 %  |
| CAPEX                     |       |       |       | -5.3  | -4.2  | ROI-%                    | 20.3 %  | 33.7 % | 68.9 %  | -17.5 % | 33.9 %  |
| Free cash flow            |       |       |       | 34.6  | 13.8  | Equity ratio             | 26.4 %  | 9.0 %  | 12.0 %  | 54.7 %  | 60.5 %  |
| Valuation multiples       | 2023  | 2024  | 2025  | 2026e | 2027e | Gearing                  | -16.3 % | 16.9 % | 29.9 %  | -46.2 % | -56.9 % |
| EV/S                      |       |       |       | 0.9   | 0.7   | Net debt/EBITDA          | -0.2    | 0.1    | 0.2     | 3.3     | -1.6    |
| EV/EBITDA                 |       |       |       | neg.  | 5.0   | EBITDA/net financials    | 46.9    | 259.4  | 23.8    | 16.8    | 350.7   |
| EV/EBIT (adj.)            |       |       |       | 7.0   | 6.2   |                          |         |        |         |         |         |
| P/E (adj.)                |       |       |       | 10.8  | 10.5  |                          |         |        |         |         |         |
| P/B                       |       |       |       | 3.6   | 2.9   |                          |         |        |         |         |         |
| Dividend-%                |       |       |       | 2.6 % | 2.9 % |                          |         |        |         |         |         |

\*The number of shares for 2023–2025 has been diluted and adjusted for the share split

Source: Inderes

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|            |                                                                                        |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| Accumulate | The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is attractive      |
| Reduce     | The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is weak            |
| Sell       | The 12-month risk-adjusted expected shareholder return of the share is very weak       |

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## Recommendation history (>12 mo)

| Date       | Recommendation | Target | Share price |
|------------|----------------|--------|-------------|
| 10/26/2026 | Accumulate     | 8.30 € | 6.95 €      |



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