contentSlug

type

ContentSlug_ContentQuery

slug

ContentPageContentQuery

content

trendingContent

query ContentSlug_ContentQuery(
  $contentSlug: String!
  $type: [ContentType!]
) {
  ...ContentPageContentQuery_13QmVO
}

fragment CompanyDetails_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  companies {
    name
    description
    pageUrl
    id
  }
}

fragment ContentBasicInfo on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  id
  type
  title
  lang
  companies {
    viewerIsFollowing
    id
    name
    pageUrl
  }
  tags {
    viewerIsFollowing
    id
    name
    pageUrl
  }
  ...PublishingDetails
  ...Reactions
}

fragment ContentMetadata on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  type
  title
  lang
  pageUrl
  alternatePageUrls: translations {
    __typename
    pageUrl
    lang
  }
  imgUrl
  description
  ... on Video {
    liveTime
    videoUrl
  }
  ... on Webcast {
    liveTime
    videoUrl
  }
}

fragment ContentPageContentQuery_13QmVO on Query {
  content(slug: $contentSlug, type: $type) {
    __typename
    id
    type
    title
    isPremium
    lang
    htmlBody
    summary
    companies {
      forum {
        latestPosts {
          ...ForumPosts
        }
      }
      name
      id
      viewerIsFollowing
      pageUrl
      defaultInstrument {
        isin
        id
        marketOpen
        marketClose
        marketplace {
          region
        }
        returns {
          total
        }
      }
    }
    tags {
      viewerIsFollowing
      id
      name
      pageUrl
    }
    createdAt
    ... on Video {
      liveTime
    }
    ... on Webcast {
      liveTime
    }
    slug
    ... on CompanyReport {
      reportUrl
    }
    ... on ThirdPartyCompanyReport {
      reportUrl
    }
    ... on StockExchangeRelease {
      reportUrl
    }
    ...ContentBasicInfo
    ...ContentMetadata
    ...PriceAndRecommendation_Content
    ...CompanyDetails_Content
    ...ReportLink_Content
    ...KeyFigures_Content
  }
  ...TrendingContent_1jQ2Cn
}

fragment ForumPosts on ForumPost {
  text
  likesCount
  url
  author
  postedAt
  authorImgUrl
}

fragment KeyFigures_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  companies {
    defaultInstrument {
      estimateData {
        modelType
        reportingCurrency
      }
      snapshot {
        transaction {
          date
          actualized {
            year
            quarter
            revenue
            revenueGrowth
            ebitAdjusted
            ebitReported
            ebitda
            enterpriseValue
            epsAdjusted
            dividend
            dividendYield
            sharePrice
            nav
            navPerShare
            opexOfNav
            quarterlySharePrice
          }
          estimates {
            year
            quarter
            revenue
            revenueGrowth
            ebitAdjusted
            ebitReported
            ebitda
            enterpriseValue
            epsAdjusted
            dividend
            dividendYield
            sharePrice
            nav
            navPerShare
            opexOfNav
            quarterlySharePrice
          }
        }
      }
      id
    }
    id
  }
}

fragment PriceAndRecommendation_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  createdAt
  companies {
    name
    pageUrl
    defaultInstrument {
      priceData {
        tradeCurrency
      }
      snapshot {
        priceData {
          date
          lastPrice
          tradeCurrency
        }
        transaction {
          date
          recommendation
          targetPrice
        }
        prevTransaction {
          recommendation
        }
      }
      id
    }
    id
  }
}

fragment PublishingDetails on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  createdAt
  publishers {
    name
    imgUrl
  }
  authors {
    __typename
    id
    name
    slug
    imgUrl
    jobTitle
  }
  ... on Video {
    liveTime
  }
  ... on Webcast {
    liveTime
  }
}

fragment Reactions on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  id
  reactionGroups {
    reactionType
    reactionsCount
    viewerReacted
  }
}

fragment ReportLink_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  type
  isPremium
  ... on CompanyReport {
    reportUrl
  }
  ... on ThirdPartyCompanyReport {
    reportUrl
  }
  ... on StockExchangeRelease {
    reportUrl
  }
}

fragment TrendingContent_1jQ2Cn on Query {
  trendingContent(type: ARTICLE) {
    __typename
    id
    title
    lang
    pageUrl
    createdAt
    type
    imgUrl
    companies {
      squareLogoUrl
      name
      id
    }
    authors {
      __typename
      imgUrl
      id
    }
    publishers {
      imgUrl
    }
  }
}


nextcell-pharma-ab-nextcell-pharma-presents-historical-quarterly-figures

__typename

title

isPremium

lang

htmlBody

summary

companies

createdAt

publishers

authors

reactionGroups

pageUrl

translations

imgUrl

description

NextCell Pharma operates in the healthcare sector. The company develops stem cell products that are mainly used in the treatment of autoimmune diabetes and kidney transplantation. A large part of the work consists of stem cell research where the company develops drug candidates that will facilitate and increase acceptance in organ transplantation. In addition, the company owns a stem cell bank. The company was founded in 2014 and has its headquarters in Huddinge.

Results are out.  The report is still messy and incomplete. CEO comments are conspicuous by their absence, etc. This started in the previous quarterly report after the CFO left. Apparently, the new CFO has not fixed the issue. The report covers an exceptional 16-month financial year (September 2024 → December 2025) due to a change in the fiscal year, which makes direct comparison to previous years difficult. The company has admitted to this confusion and announced it will publish a separate comparison document to clarify the figures shortly after the report. Revenue from QVance does not yet appear to be recognized, which is a disappointment. This is in direct contradiction with the company’s comments that turnover would have accumulated since at least late summer. In practice, however, it seems that QVance’s sales are visible in the items Advances received and commitments (+1.1 MSEK, the parent company’s share of this growth was almost non-existent), Unbilled work and accrued income (increased by approx. 0.9 MSEK from a year ago), and Accounts receivable (increased by approx. 1M SEK at the point when QVance was said to have become operational). Although accounts receivable and advances point to some kind of operational activity, the company’s cash position fell to 26 million kronor by the end of 2025 (32.7 MSEK the previous year). This was influenced at least by QVance’s new isolator, which appears on the balance sheet likely as a 4.4 million kronor work-in-progress acquisition.             cdn.prod.website-files.com              699fe987c9e393af67bc206d_NextCell%20Bokslutskommunik%C3%A9%202024%202025%20SV.pdf    643.52 KB                            Edit: The CEO will comment on the quarter tonight: Digital temakväll - Life Science | Aktiespararna

The company is truly an extreme example of poor liquidity for a listed company. Last Friday at the open: 10:03 share 1.68 (+7%) 10:05 share 1.51 (-4%) Today the range was even wider. At the open, it rose +9.5%, and a couple of minutes later, it dipped to -5.5%. Hardly any trades were made; rather, this was most likely just the momentary spread of the share. Interested by this, I tried to figure out how large the actual float of the share is, assuming we count all “sticky money” (tahmainen raha)—meaning, in addition to insiders, long-term anchor investors, larger institutions, partners, etc. Instead of calculating it myself, I fed Gemini the insider transactions, key press releases, and the latest samples of the top 10 shareholders and debated for a while, correcting errors. Getting an exact figure is difficult because part of this rigid ownership is in nominee registers, and insider ownership is also held through separate holding/investment companies. Overall, it could be said that at least a good third (over 36%) of the company is somewhat “cemented,” meaning likely not active on the market (even though there are no legal barriers to selling). Optimistically, sticky money could amount to as much as 60 million shares, or about half, if we make a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of long-term investors from previous offerings. Whatever the “effective free float” is, it can generally be assumed to have decreased following the '25 subscription and the '26 direct investment, explaining the increased volatility to some extent. Additionally, a significant portion of retail investors’ NextCell positions are surely at the bottom of portfolios, 70%–90% in the red, and there is no interest in realizing those losses. The company’s record 1-month volume, which has only been broken in terms of share count by the recent Hong Kong news and the 2025 Pro-Young results announcement + rights issue, was set in September 2020 at a price over 10 times higher than the current one. In terms of euro value, those recent volumes fall far behind. Earnings release coming up on Thursday!

New press release and the stock is showing new momentum, up 12% today. For the sharp-eyed, however, this isn’t new information, because even though Nextcell hasn’t communicated this directly to investors, yours truly spotted this 29 days ago in this discussion.

Now the valuation has doubled, and rising revenue can, with some luck, justify it as well. Haven’t investors sufficiently accounted for the potential of these subsidiaries’ operations?  I don’t believe they’ve been given much weight, as not a single euro has been seen yet. The company’s small investor base is likely suffering from a major hangover after the previous -80% crash. The base case is probably still that the company’s value is primarily just a gamble on the success of the drug pipeline and partnerships, and a company that has been diluted for six years straight will likely be diluted for a seventh. Cellaviva has been a passive shell company owning cell banks, collecting the same fixed fees year after year without any growth, and that’s why Qvance isn’t being given much credit either. I should also include a quote from myself from the Diamyd thread:  In biotech, valuation doesn’t seem to be explained by rational probability calculations, but by certain kinds of hype cycles that fluctuate between the euphoria of early and intermediate stages and the nuclear winters caused by the despair of dilutions and long waiting periods.  Some calculating opportunists only jump into the gamble just before the results are released (like last year when the value tripled in a couple of months before the young-interim results). In small-cap biotech companies with low cash reserves, the price of the gamble while waiting for major drivers is directly proportional to the holding time and inversely proportional to the market cap, which is already incredibly small; the share count will inevitably increase significantly unless a “miracle” happens. The last offering was a disaster, and the company is also very little-known, and the researcher-led team hasn’t handled investor relations or the promotion of offerings well. Now, the pricing seems to assume that Nextcell will have to start share issuance procedures during the current year. Perhaps even before the readout. And with the market cap jumping between 7-15M, it would mean that the share price could soon be half of the current one before the most important driver is possible. However, the math of the expenses is in Nextcell’s favor. The costs are really low (someone could check how much Faron burns in Phase 2). So, even though losses are incurred, the specialized service operations—for which there is apparently no competition in the Nordics—might well turn the tide. Existing research staff and laboratory infrastructure can be used operationally and capital efficiently. Personally, I believe in this miracle—with the clarification that the whole company is unlikely to turn profitable immediately before the customer base opened up by the GMP license. However, the cash might easily be made to last past the readout without dilution. Those readouts are, along with partnerships, the ultimate big catalysts in this gamble. After the Phase 2 results, there are many uncertainties ahead, but the company has shown a smart business strategy and early limited market access is possible. There may be a wait ahead, but if the gamble doesn’t result in a loss while holding, then the expected value is positive. And yes, it could also be that this is indeed the company’s last resort, at least as an investment. If the new young-readout doesn’t improve at all from the previous “honeymoon” results, will there still be a willing financier for the adult Phase 3 or a buyer for the licenses? At the same time, Diamyd might reach Western markets first, and the Hong Kong route might turn out to be the only way to capture revenue before market saturation. Qvance might also be just a final desperate attempt to consolidate at least some value for the company and provide work for the researchers in case the phase readout fails. Well, whatever the case, I’m buying this gamble at least until the readout.

Interesting reflections and new perspectives. Nextcell’s cell therapy support businesses, Cellaviva and Qvance, are interesting during Nextcell’s current “valley phase” in terms of the liquidity that is crucial for the company. Cell therapies in general are evolving rapidly, and as an investor not intimately familiar with the field, one might think that support functions would be a growth area. Regarding Qvance’s future, I recall the group CEO mentioning that forecast I noted about Qvance’s profitability sometime late last year, albeit in passing. Qvance’s own CEO likely has better information. As mentioned earlier, when Nextcell’s valuation was at its lowest, €6-7m, a couple of months ago, it could be justified by this business alone. Its growth prospects provide peace of mind regarding the risk of total loss of investment typical for biotechs. Now the valuation has doubled, and with some luck, rising revenue can justify that too. Have investors not sufficiently factored in the potential of these subsidiaries? The other matter is the main event itself, Protrans. The interim readout in late summer is a make-or-break situation. If it fails, the downward spiral could be unstoppable. Based on the evidence so far, I consider the probability of success to be good. You brought up some interesting future plans for Nextcell. Speculation will have a more solid foundation in late summer after the interim readout.

I remember the CEO stating in some presentation that Qvance would reach profitability by the end of the current year.  Are you referring to this interview with the CEO of Qvance?                   linkedin.com              🎬 Live from Nordic Life Science Days!  What amazing energy at our booth...    🎬 Live from Nordic Life Science Days!  What amazing energy at our booth today!  We were thrilled to welcome Lindsay Davies, CEO of Flemingsberg-based QVance, for a great conversation with our Cluster Manager, Natasha Bank. QVance is at the forefront...                             The interview was done 4 months ago. At that time, Lindsay said that services had been offered for 2 months, revenue is already being generated, there is a very long list of waiting customers, and “breakeven is just around the corner”. I also remember another reference to Qvance’s earning potential from the parent company’s CEO, but I can’t find it right now. One problem here is that the quarterly reports do not break down expenses by subsidiary, so there’s really no information on whether Qvance’s accounting includes only personnel costs or comprehensive laboratory infrastructure with its associated expenses.  The Fujifilm collaboration is a wildcard that could involve revenue  When it was announced, the CEO specifically described the partnership as “revenue generating,” referring to genuine business activity.  Hard to estimate the share price after the readout, optimistically 5+ SEK?  Of course, valuation is difficult to discuss when there are numerous potential drivers even before the readout (Q4 results and revenue data, Hong Kong developments, GMP license…). Naturally, the fact that the readout result being a “go-ahead” on its own can mean anything between decent and mind-blowing. But I would say that’s an underestimate. That would only result in a market cap of about 60M. The share was around those levels throughout 2021, even though it was known then that the “Young” study would have to wait until 2026. Perhaps some were still waiting for a conditional marketing authorization or rapid partnering, but the announcement on August 4, 2020, **“**NextCell obtains agreement on Paediatric Investigation Plan (PIP) from EMA” probably sealed the fact that a pediatric study is required in Europe. That 2021 valuation could certainly be described as overblown, but the company is on a completely different footing today. -The patent protection for T1D treatment is international and multi-layered, and there are also patents for other diseases, which increases the value of partnering. -Entirely new business has been rapidly developed under the company, for which there seems to be strong demand, and which has the potential to cover the entire group’s expenses, at least during Phase 2 in 2026. -A potential shortcut to the Asian markets ahead of schedule has emerged for the company. Even a slightly less favorable agreement could be made there, which would nonetheless eliminate the company’s financial worries for years to come. -Unlike in 2021, conditional approval in Europe might now actually be on the table if the “Young” results are promising. In the CEO’s interview at the end of January: “it is possible that we could even get conditional approval in Europe with that [ProTrans-Young study], and then we would want to go to the US with a ‘bridging’ study instead of doing Phase 3.” It should be noted here that although the research pipeline currently focuses on T1D treatment, NextCell’s product is not just a drug; rather, it has succeeded in developing patented methods for stem-cell-based treatments, which could have very broad possibilities if it secures resources for development. If the T1D treatment proves successful, it should be viewed as a much broader company. Making an actual numerical fair value estimate is almost impossible at this stage because there are so many questions in the air. However, I believe that especially if the quarterly report at the end of the month manages to show a significantly decreased group cash burn, it will remove the fear of immediate dilution, and the company should already be at a market cap of at least €30-50M even before the “Young” results. Even then, it would look cheap relative to many other R&D shell companies at the end of Phase 2. I, however, perhaps believe more in the potential of the treatment and give less weight to previous “Young” interim results than the market does, and I already considered the market reaction completely overblown even before the CEO’s comments about the honeymoon. By the way, the stock has outrageously low liquidity. The price might fluctuate 5-8% without much “real” trading showing in the volume, just mini-volumes of 50-2000 shares, which I assume are algorithmic trades by market makers. Overall, during February, it has come down on only about €260k of turnover from the 1.7 SEK peak to today’s lows of 1.33 SEK.

Interesting questions that I have also been pondering. Is the internal funding from Cellaviva and Qvance etc. sufficient? I remember the CEO stating in some presentation that Qvance would reach profitability by the end of the current year. Cell and tissue sales haven’t grown very quickly in recent years. The Fujifilm collaboration is a wild card that could involve income. All in all, I am slightly skeptical that the internal funding from these operations would suffice for very long, considering the upcoming needs. Funding will be needed after the Phase 2 interim readout (if successful) for presenting results in various ways, negotiations with regulators (in the East and West?), planning follow-up studies, and partner negotiations. A beggar’s position is still that of a beggar. This is indeed one reason for Nextcell’s discounted market cap state, as you have noted. The dilution risk is high. I agree that the small dilution in the winter was wise; it ensured progress until the end of the year. What is the share’s value after the interim readout?  I am optimistic about the success of that readout based on previous trial results. According to the CEO, the readout covers—as I understood it—both groups. For the older group, where the honeymoon effect lasts longer, the results are already 24 months old. For the younger group, where the duration of the effect is shorter, the readout occurs at the 12-month mark. One would think the difference would already become apparent. One starting point for the investment decision is the share’s low price relative to the company’s potential. This has materialized for Nextcell, but it has brought a problem. The market cap is so low that even a large offering doesn’t yield much relative to future needs. Hard to estimate the share price after the readout—optimistically 5+ SEK? Market psychology can play a role. Diamyd’s successful Phase 3 and its possible follow-up actions could provide a tailwind for Nextcell. However, early partnering would be important after the summer. For Diamyd, 170 patients are apparently enough for Phase 3. I haven’t looked into the costs of this phase, but in diabetes, they are likely not as high as on average in Phase 3 trials ($100,000 per subject). This likely lowers the threshold for partnering.

NextCell Pharma

At the Extraordinary General Meeting of NextCell Pharma AB (publ) ("NextCell" or the "Company") held on 21 August 2025, it was resolved that the Company shall change its financial year from ...

<div class="abstract">At the Extraordinary General Meeting of NextCell Pharma AB (publ) ("NextCell" or the "Company") held on 21 August 2025, it was resolved that the Company shall change its financial year from a broken financial year September-August to a calendar year January-December.&nbsp;The Company's first full financial year in accordance with the calendar year will be 2026. To facilitate historical comparisons and enhance transparency for future reports that will follow the calendar year structure, the Company is today publishing financial information for the five most recent comparative quarters.</div>During the extended financial year 2024/2025, the following interim reports were published:<ul>	<li align="left">Q1: September-November 2024, published 30 January 2025</li>	<li align="left">Q2: December 2024-February 2025 (accumulated September 2024-February 2025), published 25 April 2025</li>	<li align="left">Q3: February 2025-April 2025 (accumulated September 2024-April 2025), published 24 July 2025</li>	<li align="left">Q4: May 2025-August 2025 (accumulated September 2024-August 2025), published 30 October 2025</li>	<li align="left">Year-end report: October 2025-December 2025 (accumulated September 2024-December 2025), published 26 February 2026</li></ul>The Year-end Report 2025 for the period September 2024-December 2025 was NextCell Pharma's first interim report prepared in accordance with the calendar year structure. The quarter reported was October-December 2025 (accumulated September 2024-December 2025). The Q1 2026 report for the period January-March 2026 will be NextCell Pharma's first interim report under the ordinary calendar year structure and will be published on 28th of May 2026.The summary of the comparison quarters contains no new information, other than a new quarterly breakdown based on the structure of the calendar year, derived from previously published data.The report is available on the company's <a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5e68c24125378ef1a571d5e2/69a59d2b510a5574d8533271_NextCell%20-%20Historical%20comparative%20quarterly%20figures%20ENG.pdf">website.</a><div></div>