contentSlug

type

ContentSlug_ContentQuery

slug

ContentPageContentQuery

content

trendingContent

query ContentSlug_ContentQuery(
  $contentSlug: String!
  $type: [ContentType!]
) {
  ...ContentPageContentQuery_13QmVO
}

fragment CompanyDetails_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  companies {
    name
    description
    pageUrl
    id
  }
}

fragment ContentBasicInfo on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  id
  type
  title
  lang
  companies {
    viewerIsFollowing
    id
    name
    pageUrl
  }
  tags {
    viewerIsFollowing
    id
    name
    pageUrl
  }
  ...PublishingDetails
  ...Reactions
}

fragment ContentMetadata on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  type
  title
  lang
  pageUrl
  alternatePageUrls: translations {
    __typename
    pageUrl
    lang
  }
  imgUrl
  description
  ... on Video {
    liveTime
    videoUrl
  }
  ... on Webcast {
    liveTime
    videoUrl
  }
}

fragment ContentPageContentQuery_13QmVO on Query {
  content(slug: $contentSlug, type: $type) {
    __typename
    id
    type
    title
    isPremium
    lang
    htmlBody
    summary
    companies {
      forum {
        latestPosts {
          ...ForumPosts
        }
      }
      name
      id
      viewerIsFollowing
      pageUrl
      defaultInstrument {
        isin
        id
        marketOpen
        marketClose
        marketplace {
          region
        }
        returns {
          total
        }
      }
    }
    tags {
      viewerIsFollowing
      id
      name
      pageUrl
    }
    createdAt
    ... on Video {
      liveTime
    }
    ... on Webcast {
      liveTime
    }
    slug
    ... on CompanyReport {
      reportUrl
    }
    ... on ThirdPartyCompanyReport {
      reportUrl
    }
    ... on StockExchangeRelease {
      reportUrl
    }
    ...ContentBasicInfo
    ...ContentMetadata
    ...PriceAndRecommendation_Content
    ...CompanyDetails_Content
    ...ReportLink_Content
    ...KeyFigures_Content
  }
  ...TrendingContent_1jQ2Cn
}

fragment ForumPosts on ForumPost {
  text
  likesCount
  url
  author
  postedAt
  authorImgUrl
}

fragment KeyFigures_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  companies {
    defaultInstrument {
      estimateData {
        modelType
        reportingCurrency
      }
      snapshot {
        transaction {
          date
          actualized {
            year
            quarter
            revenue
            revenueGrowth
            ebitAdjusted
            ebitReported
            ebitda
            enterpriseValue
            epsAdjusted
            dividend
            dividendYield
            sharePrice
            nav
            navPerShare
            opexOfNav
            quarterlySharePrice
          }
          estimates {
            year
            quarter
            revenue
            revenueGrowth
            ebitAdjusted
            ebitReported
            ebitda
            enterpriseValue
            epsAdjusted
            dividend
            dividendYield
            sharePrice
            nav
            navPerShare
            opexOfNav
            quarterlySharePrice
          }
        }
      }
      id
    }
    id
  }
}

fragment PriceAndRecommendation_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  createdAt
  companies {
    name
    pageUrl
    defaultInstrument {
      priceData {
        tradeCurrency
      }
      snapshot {
        priceData {
          date
          lastPrice
          tradeCurrency
        }
        transaction {
          date
          recommendation
          targetPrice
        }
        prevTransaction {
          recommendation
        }
      }
      id
    }
    id
  }
}

fragment PublishingDetails on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  createdAt
  publishers {
    name
    imgUrl
  }
  authors {
    __typename
    id
    name
    slug
    imgUrl
    jobTitle
  }
  ... on Video {
    liveTime
  }
  ... on Webcast {
    liveTime
  }
}

fragment Reactions on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  id
  reactionGroups {
    reactionType
    reactionsCount
    viewerReacted
  }
}

fragment ReportLink_Content on Content {
  __isContent: __typename
  type
  isPremium
  ... on CompanyReport {
    reportUrl
  }
  ... on ThirdPartyCompanyReport {
    reportUrl
  }
  ... on StockExchangeRelease {
    reportUrl
  }
}

fragment TrendingContent_1jQ2Cn on Query {
  trendingContent(type: ARTICLE) {
    __typename
    id
    title
    lang
    pageUrl
    createdAt
    type
    imgUrl
    companies {
      squareLogoUrl
      name
      id
    }
    authors {
      __typename
      imgUrl
      id
    }
    publishers {
      imgUrl
    }
  }
}


__typename

title

isPremium

lang

htmlBody

summary

companies

createdAt

publishers

authors

reactionGroups

pageUrl

translations

imgUrl

description

Analyst

Sauli Vilén

Matias Arola

CapMan is an investment company. The vision is to be a long-term owner and create added value for the shareholders in the long term. CapMan mainly invests in medium-sized unlisted companies, properties and infrastructure facilities around the Nordic market. Furthermore, the company offers asset management, purchasing activities as well as analysis, reporting and back office services. CapMan was founded in 1989 and its headquarters are in Helsinki, Finland.

Thanks @Sauli_Vilen for the comments. I also looked at the return data that CapMan last updated in the databases in Q3 25. Buyout VII: net IRR 5% IX: -3% X: -2% But the latest XI is tracking at 12% IRR. I’m also wondering a bit how the next Special Situations fund will be raised, as the previous one is below 1x TVPI. Regarding Growth, I’m positively surprised; the first fund is tracking at nearly 30%, the second at 11%, and of course, there aren’t any major return figures yet from the latest (2024) vintage. The next vintage there could be significant, as long as the newest one performs.

I’ve come to the conclusion that the CEO’s interviews are completely useless. Truly poor communication. Even though Sauli or Kasper ask the right questions, the answer is always the same. Meaning, things went great! — Regardless of what the reported figures say. He’s seriously trying to talk black into white, as if investors don’t actually read the earnings reports. Apparently, they got a RE-AL-LY good price for Capsi too! I shouldn’t really complain this much, as I’m not forced to own this  But I’m sticking with the same attitude here: One more year! Or maybe two…? It’s especially frustrating because about a year ago I decided to believe the story of scalability being just around the corner and bought even more. At the time, I was debating whether to sell or add, and I chose the option I regret for now. I guess I’ll just sit on my current position and see what the upcoming reports look like.

What do you think about the fact that when Sauli asked the CEO in the interview about costs, which grew by a whopping 35% in Q4, Pia stated that you have to look at the full year 2025? And that as a whole, cost control was good in '25. It’s always worrying and a bit of a red flag when a skilled speaker evades relevant questions and finds a way to answer that spins the matter in a positive light. But one that doesn’t actually answer the core of the question. Which is what is being discussed here: that CapMan’s costs have chronically risen a lot for a long time. And they clearly rose in 2025 as well. From Pia’s answer, I got the impression that she doesn’t agree with investors on this, and doesn’t see (/admit) a problem when discussing the matter. From an investor’s perspective, that’s a bad thing because improvement is less likely to happen. At the same time, the message being sent is that the cost control investors are interested in is already in order. We can move on. Unfortunately, the interests of the investor and the CEO do not align then. That is not good.

This was such an interesting pick that it’s worth breaking down what went wrong!  Even at this stage, it can be said that the share price level sketched out on the back of a cigarette pack is nowhere in sight.  Let’s start with the management fees. In that calculation, the 2027 management fees were 80 MEUR. Our forecast is 75 MEUR, so it’s in the right ballpark. However, the difference here is that some of the growth has come through Dasos (brisk share series dilution + costs) and CAERUS (large minority interest + costs). Then we come to the most important thing, which is the margin. A 35% margin was assumed there, while our forecasts fall short at just over 20%. Costs have therefore increased significantly, partly due to acquisitions, but also partly through general cost growth. Performance fees (profit sharing) were expected to be 10-15 MEUR/year, whereas now the average for 2026-29 is 9 MEUR. So a small cut has been applied here as well. In total, the management business result was supposed to be 40 MEUR, while we have 26 MEUR for next year (note: 2028 is 20 MEUR, so '27 is a “too good” year).  The investment portfolio return of 20 MEUR is in line with the current forecast.  The 10 MEUR result from the service business has changed into approximately 100 MEUR in investment returns (CaPS and JAY sales). This has been reflected in lower interest expenses, but of course, the profit distribution and somewhat sluggish results of recent years have eaten into this cash position. In total, a profit before taxes of 70 MEUR and a net profit of 50 MEUR were expected. Now, the 2027 forecasts are 47 MEUR and 30 MEUR. There’s a bit more of a haircut to the bottom line because the number of shares has increased (Dasos).  P/E multiples weren’t stretched even then, and 12-15x multiples are still, in my opinion, quite relevant and even cautious. With those multiples, we reach levels of 2.3-2.8e with the 2027 forecasts. So, the fading of this sketched-out bull scenario has mainly come from earnings falling short, especially in the management business.  Note, our current forecast doesn’t actually differ that much from the forecast at that time, and this calculation was indeed a simplified illustration of the company’s potential.

We do this work for you guys  And fortunately, capital doesn’t only need to be sought from Finland, as you’re absolutely right that fundraisings of that size would be challenging if limited to the domestic market. One thing CapMan has succeeded in over the last 10 years is diversifying and expanding its investor base. The CapMan I started following in 2013 raised all its capital from a very small group of domestic investors. Nowadays, Finland’s share of the raised capital is 23% (2025 status) and the company has about 200 investors. Attached is an image from the Q4 earnings presentation:  What, then, is realistic for these new fundraisings? This is the tricky part in my opinion, because in the previous cycle, the company managed to fully subscribe all its funds, and the outlook for the flagship funds is fundamentally good. If we start with the so-called “most certain” ones, Dasos’ track record is strong even on a global scale, and the outlook for timber as an asset class is good. Historically, I understand Dasos’ fundraising has been of the “just answer the phone” variety, which says a lot about the historical appeal of the products. It’s hard to see this not eventually coming together at least close to the target size. In Infra, there is also a very good track record, and both funds are, to my understanding, on their way to the profit-sharing phase, and the outlook for the asset class is perhaps the best among alternatives. Regarding this, I am reasonably confident that we will at least clearly exceed the previous fund (doubling the old one is a tough target, though). In Real Estate, CapMan’s track record is also quite good, but the market situation in real estate is certainly much more difficult than before. The previous fundraising took place during those “wild years” when the fund was filled in record time and CapMan had to stop fundraising prematurely because the fund hit its hard cap (the amount beyond which a fund cannot be grown even if there are willing investors). There is some uncertainty here, but on the other hand, it’s very hard to see this not being established at least at the size of the previous vintage. Regarding CAERUS, I think the risk is the largest. It’s a new asset class for CapMan, and CAERUS has been away from the fundraising market for a longer time. I see a genuine risk here that the fund remains modest in size, but the company emphasizes how important it was for CAERUS to successfully return to the market. Even though they play a smaller role, the company should also be able to raise capital for smaller funds (Nest, Special Situations) and open-ended real estate funds. By the way, capital was raised quite well for the open-ended real estate funds during 2025 as well. As I said, if a significant net amount of capital isn’t raised for these funds in 2026-2027, then it certainly calls into question the company’s entire strategy and competitiveness. Regarding costs, you’re absolutely right that CapMan’s cost level has been scaled for the next size category. Relative to the current size of the business, there are too many expenses. One more answer to @Hagking’s question. No new Buyout is planned, and it looks like the traditional Buyout business is being wound down. The company still had a new Buyout fund on its slides a couple of years ago, but it has since disappeared. At least in my own projections, I’m forecasting the termination of this Buyout business. There were several poorer vintages in Buyout in between. If I recall correctly, 8, 9, and 10 all fell short of targets. The newest fund, 11, is to my understanding on its way to the profit-sharing phase, but that clearly wasn’t enough after several lackluster vintages. This is how this business works: if you don’t perform, there’s no basis for continuation.

I bought this at the 2020 COVID lows. It was being hyped here and there. I did some digging and bought it. Well, dividends have certainly come in, but it seems to be quite a laggard. The valuation just won’t rise, no matter what. Like many others, I’m also puzzled by the way management is being turned into millionaires. Selling this year is starting to look likely. I’ll keep following it for now, though.

Is a new buyout vintage expected from CapMan, or did the previous one go so poorly that a successor isn’t being raised? It’s likely the 2020 vintage, and the TVPI hasn’t exactly developed well, staying close to 1x?

CapMan

We have revised our forecasts upwards with the very strong Q1 report, and the company's profit outlook remains excellent. With the declined share price and our elevated forecasts, the expected return on the share has improved considerably.

<p>We have revised our forecasts upwards with the very strong Q1 report, and the company's profit outlook remains excellent. With the declined share price and our elevated forecasts, the expected return on the share has improved considerably and we believe that the current share price offers an excellent opportunity to jump in CapMan's ride.</p> 

	2021	22e	23e
Revenue	52.8	79.8	81.8
growth-%	22.8 %	51.3 %	2.5 %
EBIT (adj.)	44.6	57.0	47.0
EBIT-% (adj.)	84.6 %	71.4 %	57.4 %
EPS (adj.)	0.22	0.26	0.21
Dividend	0.15	0.16	0.17
Dividend %	4.9 %	8.6 %	9.1 %
P/E (adj.)	13.9	7.3	8.7
EV/EBITDA	10.9	5.2	6.4

CapMan: Valuation starting to look cheap

Login required

Key Estimate Figures28.04.2022

Forum discussions